After 11 September, 2001, there has been a focus on how to reduce the risk for new terror attacks on society. In transport in general, and transport of dangerous goods (hazardous materials) in particular, a number of steps have been taken to reduce the risks for antagonistic attacks. One such step was to introduce a requirement for all carriers of high-consequence dangerous goods to implement a security plan for the transport. To establish the usefulness and relevance of today’s regulations there is a need to make a more thorough analysis. Due to the fact that so far very few antagonistic attacks, deriving from the transport of dangerous goods, have been launched, other material for analyzing is needed. Even if hazardous materials have been involved in most attacks, the transport itself is rarely used as a tool for the attack. Our way to facilitate the analysis was to create twelve different scenarios, where a more or less likely chain of events, leading to an antagonistic attack, was described. The scenarios were written in an anecdotic or fiction-like manner. All scenarios were analyzed based on three main characteristics: psychological impact, resources needed and the possibility of counteractions to the threat. Then it was possible to discuss the effectiveness of the regulations, which address security in dangerous goods transport. It was concluded that some areas are of great interest for reducing risks related to antagonistic threats. First, the development of security plans and the possible audit of security plans. Second, consideration of selective routing for transports of dangerous goods (in a dynamic perspective, i.e. based on the currently existing risks). And third, the management of information and the use of telematics in the transport of dangerous goods. The report is included in a research project, SecureFlow’05, being carried out with the University College of Borås as lead partner and with financial support from the Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems VINNOVA.