This essay explores notions of knowledge and intelligence in war, with a particular emphasis on knowledge about knowledge. It is argued that such second order knowledge deserves more attention in military training and education, especially in the context of maneuver warfare. More precisely, information operations within the maneuver warfare paradigm largely aim to present or withhold (second order) knowledge to the enemy in order to gain an advantage. This is elaborated using cultural and historical examples. Furthermore, the relevance of flaws and biases in human cognition and decision-making in war are discussed. In particular, it is argued that while tactical decision-making can be much improved upon through training and exercises, it is more difficult to train experts in strategic decision-making. The article is concluded with some reflections and recommendations for how to improve military training and education.

This essay uses the quandary facing Swedish security policy decision-makers in 1863 as a starting point to discuss a few timeless topics of national strategy. Affected by pan-Scandinavian sentiments, in July 1863 Charles XV made a declaration of solidarity with Denmark, which faced a military threat from the German Confederation, promising Swedish troops to help defend the southern border of the Duchy of Schleswig. However, the King had not secured the support of his cabinet, which refused to back the King’s policy, so that despite intense diplomatic activity, no military assistance to Denmark was given when the Second Schleswig War eventually started. Using this historical experience as a case-study, observations and reflections are made about the security policy of small states, about the need to coordinate and de-conflict policy initiatives within the core executive, and about what is required for a declaration of solidarity to be credible.

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence have spawned a prolific debate about the future of employment and labour in a world where even intellectual work can be performed by algorithms and robots rather than humans. This article discusses the impact of this development on military professions, and on the very concept of military professionalism. Considering military capability to be built from physical, conceptual, and moral factors, it is observed that with increasing automation of the first and second factors, the human contribution will increasingly be in the third, moral, realm. It is also argued that such a human contribution can still tip the scales, even in a high-­tech conflict. Reasoning by analogies, it is claimed that ‘man or machine’ is a false dichotomy, that the challenge is, rather, to find the best combination of the two and that this holds true also in highly intellectual aspects of warfighting, such as intelligence analysis. The article is concluded with some reflections on the challenge of creating innovative military organizations that are tolerant to new divisions of labour between man and machine.