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  • 1.
    Bellander, Ulf
    et al.
    RISE, SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Sveriges tekniska forskningsinstitut, CBI - Cement- och betonginstitutet.
    Thorsén, Anders
    Samverkan mellan TT-element och pågjuten överbetong.: En fältundersökning1976Report (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Cassel, Anders
    et al.
    Qamcom Research and Technology Ab, Sweden.
    Bergenhem, Carl
    Qamcom Research and Technology Ab, Sweden.
    Christensen, Ole Martin
    Qamcom Research and Technology Ab, Sweden.
    Heyn, Hans-Martin
    Volvo Technology Ab, Sweden.
    Leadersson-Olsson, Susanna
    Veoneer Sweden Ab, Sweden.
    Majdandzic, Mario
    Semcon Sweden Ab, Sweden.
    Sun, Peng
    Veoneer Sweden Ab, Sweden.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Trygvesson, Jörgen
    Comentor Ab, Sweden.
    On Perception Safety Requirements and Multi Sensor Systems for Automated Driving Systems2020In: SAE technical paper series, ISSN 0148-7191, Vol. 2020-April, no AprilArticle in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One major challenge in designing SAE level 3-5 Automated Driving Systems (ADS) is to define requirements for the perception system that would enable argumentation for safe operation. The safety requirements on the perception system can only be fulfilled through redundancy in the sensor hardware. It is, however, a challenge to specify the redundancy that is required in the sensor system. Safe operation for an ADS is significantly more difficult compared to advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS). The safety argumentation for ADAS typically argues that in case of a failure in the sensor array a fail-silent behavior is acceptable because the human driver can take control of the vehicle back. This argumentation however is not possible when developing level 4 or higher automation. This paper investigates prerequisites for applying a systematic methodology for analyzing redundancy in a multi-sensor system and the relation to a conceptual ADS functional architecture. This analysis must address the complexity that comes with partially overlapping sensor data from different sensors and considers variations in performance and characteristics due to changes in the environmental conditions. The paper introduces the term incomplete redundancy and presents a systematic methodology for analyzing redundancy. The aim is to provide arguments for how several sensors in a system, when appropriately combined, meet an assigned safety requirement on a higher level. Each sensor will then be assigned a certain responsibility and contributes with a sub-set of information. A set of questions of importance to address as a foundation for such a methodology are defined and discussed. The definitions of redundancy and independence between sensors are discussed as well as contract-based functional safety to adapt to different environmental and operating conditions.

  • 3.
    Gyllenhammar, Magnus
    et al.
    Zenuity AB, Sweden.
    Johansson, Rolf
    Autonomous Intelligent Driving, Sweden.
    Warg, Fredrik
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Chen, DeJiu
    KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
    Heyn, Hans-Martin
    Volvo Technology AB, Sweden.
    Sanfridson, Martin
    Volvo Technology AB, Sweden.
    Söderberg, Jan
    Systemite AB, Sweden.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Ursing, Stig
    Semcon Sweden AB, Sweden.
    Towards an Operational Design Domain That Supports the Safety Argumentation of an Automated Driving System2020In: 10th European Congress on Embedded Real Time Systems (ERTS 2020), Toulouse, France, 2020Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the biggest challenges for self-driving road vehicles is how to argue that their safety cases are complete.The operational design domain (ODD) of the automated driving system (ADS) can be used to restrict where the ADS is valid and thus confine the scope of the safety case as well as the verification. To complete the safety case there is a need to ensure that the ADS will not exit its ODD. We present four generic strategies to ensure this. Use cases (UCs) provide a convenient way providing such a strategy for a collection of operating conditions (OCs) and furth erensures that the ODD allows for operation within the real world. A framework to categorise the OCs of a UC is presented and it is suggested that the ODD is written with this structure in mind to facilitate mapping towards potential UCs. The ODD defines the functional boundary of the system and modelling it with this structure makes it modular and generalisable across different potential UCs. Further, using the ODD to connect the ADS to the UC enables the continuous delivery of the ADS feature. Two examples of dimensions of the ODD are given and a strategy to avoid an ODD exit is proposed in the respective case.

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  • 4.
    Henriksson, Jens
    et al.
    Semcon, Sweden.
    Ursing, Stig
    Semcon, Sweden.
    Erdogan, Murat
    Veoneer, Sweden.
    Warg, Fredrik
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Jaxing, Johan
    Agreat, Sweden.
    Örsmark, Ola
    Comentor, Sweden.
    Örtenberg Toftås, Mathias
    Semcon, Sweden.
    Out-of-Distribution Detection as Support for Autonomous Driving Safety Lifecycle2023In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatic. )Volume 13975 LNCS, Pages 233 - 242, Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH , 2023, p. 233-242Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The automotive industry is moving towards increased automation, where features such as automated driving systems typically include machine learning (ML), e.g. in the perception system. [Question/Problem] Ensuring safety for systems partly relying on ML is challenging. Different approaches and frameworks have been proposed, typically where the developer must define quantitative and/or qualitative acceptance criteria, and ensure the criteria are fulfilled using different methods to improve e.g., design, robustness and error detection. However, there is still a knowledge gap between quality methods and metrics employed in the ML domain and how such methods can contribute to satisfying the vehicle level safety requirements. In this paper, we argue the need for connecting available ML quality methods and metrics to the safety lifecycle and explicitly show their contribution to safety. In particular, we analyse Out-of-Distribution (OoD) detection, e.g., the frequency of novelty detection, and show its potential for multiple safety-related purposes. I.e., as (a) an acceptance criterion contributing to the decision if the software fulfills the safety requirements and hence is ready-for-release, (b) in operational design domain selection and expansion by including novelty samples into the training/development loop, and (c) as a run-time measure, e.g., if there is a sequence of novel samples, the vehicle should consider reaching a minimal risk condition. [Contribution] This paper describes the possibility to use OoD detection as a safety measure, and the potential contributions in different stages of the safety lifecycle. © 2023, The Author(s)

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  • 5.
    Jacobson, Jan
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Electronics.
    Westgaard Berg, Kari
    Lörenskog Kommune, Norway.
    Bügel, Daniel
    Kunnskapsbyen Lilleström, Norway.
    Flink, Kristian
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Electronics.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Electronics.
    Tornvall, Charlotta
    Borås Stad, Sweden.
    Lie Venjum, Mari
    Lörenskog Kommune, Norway.
    Självkörande bussar i stadstrafik - förstudie2018Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Automated road transport is regarded as a key enabler for sustainable transport. One example is the use of small automated buses as a supplement to already existing public transport services. There are several manufacturers of these kind of buses, and field trials are in progress.

    The goal of the pre-project is to evaluate the feasibility and criteria for transport with automated buses in two middle-sized Nordic municipalities, Lørenskog in Norway and Borås in Sweden, by analyzing at least two different test-cases in each location. Feasibility, adaptation to existing traffic and conditions for public acceptance are described. The pre-project concludes that automated buses are possible in these two municipalities. Further test and demonstrations should be made.

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  • 6. Johansson, Lars
    et al.
    Thorsén, Anders
    Garage och P-hus2010In: Betong, ISSN 1101-9190, no 1Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 7. Olsson, Anders
    et al.
    Enoksson, P.
    Stemme, G.
    Stemme, E.
    A valve-less planar pump isotropically etched in silicon1995In: Micromechanics Europe 1995 (MME ’95), Copenhagen, Denmark, 1995Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Olsson, Anders
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, ICT, Acreo.
    Stemme, G.
    Stemme, E.
    Numerical and experimental studies of flat-walled diffuser elements for valve-less micropumps2000In: Sensors and Actuators, A: Physical, Vol. 84, no 1, p. 165-175Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Pelliccione, Patrizio
    et al.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden; University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Kobetski, Avenir
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), ICT, SICS.
    Larsson, Tony
    Halmstad University, Sweden.
    Aramrattana, Maytheewat
    Halmstad University, Sweden; VTI, Sweden.
    Aderum, Tobias
    Autoliv Research, Sweden.
    Ågren, S. Magnus
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden; University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Jonsson, Göran
    Volvo Cars, Sweden.
    Heldal, Rogardt
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden; University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Bergenhem, Carl
    Qamcom Research and Technology AB, Sweden.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Electronics.
    Architecting cars as constituents of a system of systems2016In: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Software-intensive Systems-of-Systems at 10th European Conference on Software Architecture, ACM , 2016, article id 5Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Future transportation systems will be a heterogeneous mix of items with varying connectivity and interoperability. A mix of new technologies and legacy systems will co-exist to realize a variety of scenarios involving not only connected cars but also road infrastructures, pedestrians, cyclists, etc. Future transportation systems can be seen as a System of Systems (SoS), where each constituent system - one of the units that compose an SoS - can act as a standalone system, but the cooperation among the constituent systems enables new emerging and promising scenarios. In this paper we investigate how to architect cars so that they can be constituents of future transportation systems. This work is realized in the context of two Swedish projects coordinated by Volvo Cars and involving some universities and research centers in Sweden and many suppliers of the OEM, including Autoliv, Arccore, Combitech, Cybercom, Knowit, Prevas, ÅF-Technology, Semcom, and Qamcom.

  • 10.
    Skoglund, Martin
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Arrue, Alvaro
    Applus IDIADA, Span.
    Coget, Jean Baptiste
    Institut VEDECOM, France.
    Rahal, Mohamed Cherif
    Institut VEDECOM, France.
    Plestan, Camille
    Institut VEDECOM, France.
    Technical and functional requirements for V2X communication, positioning and cyber-security in the HEADSTART project2021Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Connected and AutomatedD riving (CAD) features rely on s e v er al key technologies to function safelyat the vehicle and compone nt level. HEADSTART (Harm onised European Solutions fo r TestingAutomated Road Transport) is a research project fund ed by the European Union tha t aims to definetesting and validation pro c e d ur e s for CAD features with a focus on three K ey Enabling Technologi es(KETs): Vehicle to eve rything (V2X) communication, Positioning and Cyber security. This paperpresent s the technical and functional requ i rements for these three KETs including w h a t is n e eded forthese technol ogies to work corre ctly (at vehicle and c omponent level) and what is needed to verify andvali d ate them in proving ground and simulation environment. The final aim is to satisfy t h e safetyrequirements to protect the veh i c l e i ts e lf and the other road users.

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  • 11.
    Skoglund, Martin
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Warg, Fredrik
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Bergman, Mats
    Telia Company, Sweden.
    Enhancing Safety Assessment of Automated Driving Systems with Key Enabling Technology Assessment Templates2023In: Vehicles, ISSN 2624-8921, Vol. 5, no 4, p. 1818-1843Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The emergence of Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) has transformed the landscape of safety assessment. ADSs, capable of controlling a vehicle without human intervention, represent a significant shift from traditional driver-centric approaches to vehicle safety. While traditional safety assessments rely on the assumption of a human driver in control, ADSs require a different approach that acknowledges the machine as the primary driver. Before market introduction, it is necessary to confirm the vehicle safety claimed by the manufacturer. The complexity of the systems necessitates a new comprehensive safety assessment that examines and validates the hazard identification and safety-by-design concepts and ensures that the ADS meets the relevant safety requirements throughout the vehicle lifecycle. The presented work aims to enhance the effectiveness of the assessment performed by a homologation service provider by using assessment templates based on refined requirement attributes that link to the operational design domain (ODD) and the use of Key Enabling Technologies (KETs), such as communication, positioning, and cybersecurity, in the implementation of ADSs. The refined requirement attributes can serve as safety-performance indicators to assist the evaluation of the design soundness of the ODD. The contributions of this paper are: (1) outlining a method for deriving assessment templates for use in future ADS assessments; (2) demonstrating the method by analysing three KETs with respect to such assessment templates; and (3) demonstrating the use of assessment templates on a use case, an unmanned (remotely assisted) truck in a limited ODD. By employing assessment templates tailored to the technology reliance of the identified use case, the evaluation process gained clarity through assessable attributes, assessment criteria, and functional scenarios linked to the ODD and KETs.

  • 12.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    SUNRISE D3.1 : Report on baseline analysis of existing Methodology: Safety assUraNce fRamework for connected, automated mobIlity SystEms2023Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Safety assurance of cooperative, connected, and automated mobility (CCAM) systems is crucial for their successful adoption in society. To demonstrate that such systems are safe in their complete operational design domains (ODDs) requires robust safety argumentation. The aim of the SUNRISE project is to develop and demonstrate a safety assurance framework (SAF) for the test and safety validation of a varied scope of such systems. Scenario-based testing methods is believed to become an important part of the safety assessment approach for automated driving systems (ADSs). The SUNRISE project’s forerunner project HEADSTART developed a methodology for safety validation of connected and automated vehicles centred around scenario-based testing, a methodology that SUNRISE will develop further and integrate as a part of the SUNRISE SAF. Focus for Work Package 3 of the SUNRISE project is to define and condense an overall methodology to support the safety argumentation using data- and knowledge-driven, scenario-based testing. This report presents a literature study and baseline tracking of the existing scenario-based methodologies, especially, based on the knowledge and literature review of the HEADSTART project. First, the SUNRISE SAF and scenario-based methodologies are introduced including a suitable taxonomy. Second, the HEADSTART method is summarized in detail. Third, scenario-based methodologies from other projects are described. Fourth, an overview of relevant standardization efforts is presented with a particular focus on the ISO 3450X series “Road vehicles – Test scenarios for automated driving systems”. Fifth, other initiatives related to scenario-based safety assessment (mainly outside the EU) are described. Sixth, an extensive analysis is presented comparing the HEADSTART methodology with the other described initiatives. Seventh and final, the findings are summarised in the conclusions. The SUNRISE methodology will use the HEADSTART methodology as input complemented with other existing best practices documented in this report. For areas that was in focus for the HEADSTART project, such as scenario concept, test scenario selection and test scenario allocation, the HEADSTART method is concluded to be well defined for future development. Important is that the SUNRISE scenario concept need to be versatile and adoptable for scenario concepts used in all relevant existing scenario databases. As far as possible the scenario concept should also be adoptable for possible future relevant scenario concepts. Other areas, like scenario sources, scenario generation, and scenario databases, were not in focus for HEASTART and only conceptually defined. The SUNRISE data framework is essential to solve these parts as SUNRISE, like HEADSTART, relays on external scenario databases. Further, the HEADSTART methodology needs to be complemented with elements like risk assessment, monitoring in order to identify unknown scenarios, and qualitative and quantitative metrics to determine the completeness of a scenario database.

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  • 13.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    SUNRISE D4.1 : Report on relevant subsystems to validate CCAM systems: Safety assUraNce fRamework for connected, automated mobIlity SystEms2023Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Safety assurance of cooperative, connected, and automated mobility (CCAM) systems is crucial for their successful adoption in society, and it is necessary to demonstrate reliability in their complete operational design domains (ODD). For higher level of automation, i.e., when the vehicle takes over the responsibility from the human driver, it is commonly accepted that validation only by means of real test-drives would be infeasible. Instead, a mixture of physical and virtual testing is seen as a promising approach, in which the virtual part accelerates testing procedure and significantly reduces cost. This in turn accelerates the time to market. The SUNRISE project aims to develop a Safety Assurance Framework (SAF) for scenario-based safety validation of CCAM systems, covering a broad portfolio of use cases and comprehensive test and validation tools. Part of this project focuses onto developing a harmonised verification and validation (V&V) simulation framework for CCAM systems. To overcome the limitations of virtual simulation, the targeted SAF also will include hybrid and real-world testing and validation approaches. This deliverable presents the findings from the task to identify relevant subsystems of a harmonised V&V simulation framework for virtual validation of CCAM systems applying a scenario-based testing methodology. The involved partners have together identified and agreed on a non-exclusive list of relevant subsystems: (1) test case manager, (2) environment, (3) subject vehicle, (4) traffic agents, (5) connectivity, and (6) simulation model validation. The subject vehicle subsystems include blocks for sensors, AD function, and vehicle dynamics and the AD function block includes subblocks for perception, planning, and control and act. This deliverable primarily focuses on virtual simulations, but the SAF also covers XiL tests, were some of the listed subsystems can be replaced with the real components. After the subsystems are described, the subsystem requirements are analysed form the perspective of requirements on tools, interfaces, V&V of the simulation framework, and model fidelity. Many of the participants have experience in simulation tools, but the presented work is mainly theoretical, and the actual development of the simulation framework is done in subsequent tasks of WP4. The intention is that the definition of the simulation framework and the listed subsystems shall be versatile and adoptable for future technology development.

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  • 14.
    Thorsén, Anders
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Sangchoolie, Behrooz
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Folkesson, Peter
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Strandberg, Ted
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Combined Safety and Cybersecurity Risk Assessment for Intelligent Distributed Grids2022Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    As more parts of the power grid become connected to the internet, the risk of cyberattacks increases. To identify the cybersecurity threats and subsequently reduce vulnerabilities, the common practice is to carry out a cybersecurity risk assessment. For safety classified systems and products, there is also a need for safety risk assessments in addition to the cybersecurity risk assessment in order to identify and reduce safety risks. These two risk assessments are usually done separately, but since cybersecurity and functional safety are often related, a more comprehensive method covering both aspects is needed. Some work addressing this has been done for specific domains like the automotive domain, but more general methods suitable for, e.g., Intelligent Distributed Grids, are still missing. One such method from the automotive domain is the Security-Aware Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (SAHARA) method that combines safety and cybersecurity risk assessments. This paper presents an approach where the SAHARA method has been modified in order to be more suitable for larger distributed systems. The adapted SAHARA method has a more general risk assessment approach than the original SAHARA. The proposed method has been successfully applied on two use cases of an intelligent distributed grid.

  • 15.
    Thorsén, Anders
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Sangchoolie, Behrooz
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Folkesson, Peter
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Strandberg, Ted
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Combined Safety and Cybersecurity Risk Assessment for Intelligent Distributed Grids2022In: World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Energy and Power Engineering, Vol. 16, no 5, p. 69-76Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    As more parts of the power grid become connected to the internet, the risk of cyberattacks increases. To identify the cybersecurity threats and subsequently reduce vulnerabilities, the common practice is to carry out a cybersecurity risk assessment. For safety classified systems and products, there is also a need for safety risk assessments in addition to the cybersecurity risk assessment to identify and reduce safety risks. These two risk assessments are usually done separately, but since cybersecurity and functional safety are often related, a more comprehensive method covering both aspects is needed. Some work addressing this has been done for specific domains like the automotive domain, but more general methods suitable for, e.g., Intelligent Distributed Grids, are still missing. One such method from the automotive domain is the Security-Aware Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (SAHARA) method that combines safety and cybersecurity risk assessments. This paper presents an approach where the SAHARA method has been modified to be more suitable for larger distributed systems. The adapted SAHARA method has a more general risk assessment approach than the original SAHARA. The proposed method has been successfully applied on two use cases of an intelligent distributed grid.

  • 16. Van Der Wijngaart, W.
    et al.
    Thorsén, Anders
    Stemme, G.
    A seat microvalve nozzle for optimal gas flow capacity at large controlled pressure2004In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS), p. 233-236Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 17. Van der Wijngaart, W
    et al.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE, Swedish ICT, Acreo.
    Stemme, G
    A seat microvalve nozzle for optimal gas flow capacity at large controlled pressure2004In: J.MEMS, Vol. 17, p. 233-Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Vu, Victoria
    et al.
    Semcon Sweden AB, Sweden.
    Warg, Fredrik
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Ursing, Stig
    Semcon Sweden AB, Sweden.
    Sunnerstam, Fredrik
    Agreat AB, Sweden.
    Holler, Jimmy
    Epiroc Rock Drills AB, Sweden.
    Bergenhem, Carl
    Qamcom Research and Technology AB, Sweden.
    Cosmin, Irina
    Agreat AB, Sweden.
    Minimal Risk Manoeuvre Strategies for Cooperative and Collaborative Automated Vehicles2023In: 2023 53rd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN-W), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2023, p. 116-123Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    During the last decade, there has been significant increase in research focused on automated vehicles (AVs) and ensuring safe operation of these vehicles. However, challenges still remain, some involving the cooperation and collaboration of multiple AVs, including when and how to perform a minimal risk manoeuvre (MRM), leading to a minimal risk condition (MRC) when an AV within one of these systems is unable to complete its original goal. As most literature is focused on individual AVs, there is a need to adapt and extend the knowledge and techniques to these new contexts. Based on existing knowledge of individual AVs, this paper explores MRM strategies involving cooperative and collaborative AV systems with different capabilities. Specifically, collaborative systems have the potential to enact local MRCs, allowing continued productivity despite having one (or several) of its constituents encounter a fault. Definitions are provided for local and global MRCs, alongside discussions of their implications for MRMs. Illustrative examples are also presented for each type of system.

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  • 19.
    Warg, Fredrik
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Johansson, Rolf
    Autonomous Intelligent Driving, Sweden.
    Skoglund, Martin
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Brännström, Mattias
    Zenuity AB, Sweden.
    Gyllenhammar, Magnus
    Zenuity AB, Sweden.
    Sanfridson, Martin
    Volvo Technology AB, Sweden.
    The Quantitative Risk Norm - A Proposed Tailoring of HARA for ADS2020In: Proceedings of 2020 50th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN-W), Los Alamitos, 2020Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the major challenges of automated drivingsystems (ADS) is showing that they drive safely. Key to ensuringsafety is eliciting a complete set of top-level safety requirements(safety goals). This is typically done with an activity called hazardanalysis and risk assessment (HARA). In this paper we argue thatthe HARA of ISO 26262:2018 is not directly suitable for an ADS,both because the number of relevant operational situations maybe vast, and because the ability of the ADS to make decisionsin order to reduce risks will affect the analysis of exposure andhazards. Instead we propose a tailoring using a quantitative risknorm (QRN) with consequence classes, where each class has alimit for the frequency within which the consequences may occur.Incident types are then defined and assigned to the consequenceclasses; the requirements prescribing the limits of these incidenttypes are used as safety goals to fulfil in the implementation.The main benefits of the QRN approach are the ability to showcompleteness of safety goals, and make sure that the safetystrategy is not limited by safety goals which are not formulatedin a way suitable for an ADS.

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  • 20.
    Warg, Fredrik
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Liandrat, Sebastien
    CEREMA, France.
    Donzella, Valentina
    University of Warwick, UK.
    Lee, Graham
    University of Warwick, UK.
    Hung Chan, Pak
    University of Warwick, UK.
    Viinanen, Reija
    Sensible 4 OY, Finland.
    Kangasrääsiö, Antti
    Sensible 4 OY, Finland.
    Cihan, Umut
    Ford Otomotiv Sanayi AS, Turkey.
    Hyyti, Heikki
    Finnish Geospatial Research Institute, Finland.
    Waldheuer, Tobias
    ZF Friedrichshafen AG, Germany.
    Poledna, Yuri
    Technische Hochschule Ingolstadt, Germany.
    Matilainen, Jalmari
    Sensible 4 OY, Finland.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    ROADVIEW Robust Automated Driving in Extreme Weather: Deliverable D2.1 : Definition of the complex environment conditions . WP2 – Physical system setup, use cases, requirements and standards. Project No. 1010695762023Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The overarching goal of the ROADVIEW project is performance improvements in perception and decision-making subsystems for connected automated vehicles (CAVs) under harsh weather conditions such as rain, fog, or snow, which is necessary to enable the widespread use of automated vehicles. In support of this overarching goal, this deliverable (D2.1) describes complex environments—including levels of harsh weather conditions and density of heterogeneous traffic—to be used for the R&D activities and evaluations in WPs 3 – 8. The environment descriptions are in the form of operational design domain (ODD) definitions meant to be combined with the use cases defined in D2.2. The ODD definitions are specified by using and extending the ODD taxonomy defined in ISO 34503 [3], considering the needs of the ROADVIEW use cases, and the environmental conditions especially relevant for the sensor types investigated in the project. This deliverable first defines terminology related to driving automation systems, ODDs, and testing—where a key purpose is to verify that the CAV operates safely within its ODD. Then harsh weather conditions and the main sensor types intended to be used in the project are discussed. Sensors are investigated with respect to which weather conditions and which metrics for these conditions are relevant to perform verification against the defined ODD (e.g., rain metrics can be intensity specified in mm/h and droplet size distribution). Next follows a discussion on particularly relevant ODD attributes and why we have chosen certain metrics and classifications, and in some instances added new attributes not mentioned in ISO 34503. Finally, ODD definitions are developed for the different types of road environments, or drivable areas, defined in D2.2, i.e., highway, urban traffic, and rural road. D2.2 also defines several use cases for automated vehicles that are relevant for these drivable areas and will be used by the other WPs, together with the ODD definitions from this deliverable, to create test scenarios. Objectives The main objective of this deliverable is to create ODD definitions for the use cases investigated in the project, especially detailing harsh weather conditions with a focus on rain, fog, and snow. By combining these harsh conditions with use cases defined in D2.2, the project will have the basis for working on perception and decision-making improvements for such conditions, and for defining relevant test cases to apply in different test environments used in the project (simulation, x-in-the-Loop, weather test facilities, test tracks, and open-road tests). Together, D2.1 and D2.2 aim to fulfil ROADVIEW Objective 1: Define complex environmental conditions and use case specifications. Methodology and implementation Since the overarching goal of ROADVIEW is to improve performance for CAVs in harsh weather conditions, this deliverable aims to specify an ODD taxonomy specifically including (1) operational conditions relevant for harsh weather conditions with respect to the design and verification of advanced environmental sensors and decision-making systems, and (2) operational conditions relevant for the specific use-cases to be evaluated in the project. The methodology was to, as far as possible, make sure the project uses ODD taxonomy and other terminology from existing sources, in particular existing or soon-to-be-released standards [1][2][3][4][6], to make sure we use terms in a way already established in the automotive domain and avoid inventing new terms where there are already existing alternatives. Given this starting point, a group of experts in sensor technology, test environments, and the providers of use cases have collected and analysed what kind of harsh conditions should be included, and if there is a need to refine the existing ODD taxonomy with new or more detailed attributes or new metrics. Finally, an ODD definition is developed corresponding to each of the three types of drivable areas defined in D2.2. Outcomes This deliverable provides initial ODD definitions covering the drivable areas developed in deliverable D2.2—urban (city) traffic, (multi-lane) highway, and (single-lane) rural road, with and without infrastructure extensions—given our knowledge in the early phases of the ROADVIEW project. Refinements that may be necessary during the project will be described in later project deliverables. Next steps The use cases are further defined in deliverable D2.2. The further work towards the overarching goal performed in ROADVIEW WP 3-8 will use the ODD taxonomy and use case specifications as input for the evaluation and demonstration of the improvements developed in the project. Evaluation of the system prototypes used in the project is part of the integration and demonstration work package (WP8).

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  • 21.
    Warg, Fredrik
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Thorsén, Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Electrification and Reliability.
    Cassel, Anders
    Qamcom Research and Technology AB, Sweden.
    Jaradat, Omar
    Qamcom Research and Technology AB, Sweden.
    Nejad, Negin
    Qamcom Research and Technology AB, Sweden.
    Chen, DeJiu
    KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
    Ursing, Stig
    Semcon Sweden AB, Sweden.
    Managing Continuous Assurance of Complex Dependable Systems: Report from a workshop held at the Scandinavian Conference on System and Software Safety (SCSSS) 2022.2022Other (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The SALIENCE4CAV project has done work on enabling continuous assurance, which aims to ensure safety is maintained throughout the entire lifecycle of a product, system, or service. One key technique is the use of safety contracts and modular assurance cases for systematically managing safety responsibilities and requirements across different stakeholders. This report summarizes outcomes from a workshop where discussions were held around this work. The participants were predominantly working in domains with high dependability requirements, such as automotive. Knowledge, tools, and organizational issues are seen as some key obstacles, but interest is high, and the community realizes the need for enabling continuous assurance.

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