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  • 1.
    Boddaert, S.
    et al.
    CSTB, France .
    Bonomo, P
    SUPSI, Switzerland .
    Eder, G
    OFI, Austria .
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Ishii, H
    LIXIL Corporation, Japan .
    Kim, J-T
    Kongju National University, Republic of Korea .
    Ko, Y
    National Research Council Canada, Canada .
    Kovacs, Peter
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Samhällsbyggnad, Energi och resurser.
    Li, Tian
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Olano, X
    Tecnalia, Spain .
    Parolini, F
    SUPSI, Switzerland .
    Qi, D
    Université de Sherbrooke, Canada .
    Shabunko, V
    SERIS, Singapore .
    Slooff, L
    TNO, Netherlands .
    Stølen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Valencia, D
    Tecnalia, Spain .
    Villa, S
    TNO, Netherlands .
    Wilson, H R
    Fraunhofer, Germany .
    Yang, R
    RMIT, Australia.
    Zang, Y
    RMIT, Australia.
    Fire safety of BIPV: International mapping of accredited and R&D facilities in the context of codes and standards 20232023Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    The objective of Task 15 of the IEA Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme is to create an enabling framework to accelerate the penetration of BIPV products in the global market of renewables, resulting in an equal playing field for BIPV products, BAPV products and regular building envelope components, respecting mandatory issues, aesthetic issues, reliability issues, and financial issues.

    Subtask E of Task 15 is focused on pre-normative international research on BIPV characterisation methods and activity E.3 is dedicated to fire safety of BIPV modules and installations.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 2.
    Daaland Wormdahl, Espen
    et al.
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    ISO 20088-1 en iskald standard for testing av isolasjonsmaterialer2016Inngår i: Brandposten, nr 55, s. 7-7Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 3.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Fjærestad, Janne Siren
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Stölen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Holmvaag, Ole Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    EBOB – Solcelleinstallasjoner på bygg: Brannspredning og sikkerhet for brannvesen2022Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    EBOB - Solar cell installations on buildings. Fire spread and safety for fire services.

    The aim of the project has been to answer the following four research questions: 1. How do wind speed and air gap size affect the fire development in the cavity between the solar cell module and the underlying roof structure, and how do these factors affect the extent of damage to the underlying roof structure? 2. How do solar cell modules affect a fire on a realistic, Norwegian, pitched roof? 3. What work is ongoing in Europe and internationally to developing test methods for fire technical documentation of photovoltaic modules, and how should this be implemented in Norway? 4. How should fire service personnel be secured in their work when the fire includes solar cell installation? In this research question, larger installations beyond residential houses and detached houses are also relevant, including larger buildings, flat roofs and BIPV. To answer research questions 1 and 2, a total of 29 experiments were performed with fire spread in the cavity behind solar cell modules on pitched roof surfaces. The experiments were performed at RISE Fire Research's laboratory in Trondheim in 2021. This main report (RISE report 2022:82) summarizes the entire project, and additional details from the experiments performed are given in a separate technical report (RISE report 2022:83). The main findings from the experiments are that solar cell modules mounted parallel to the roof surface on pitched roofs can affect the fire dynamics of a fire on the roof surface. It was found that both the length of the damaged area on the roof and the temperature rise inwards in the roof (below the chipboard) increased when the distance between the simulated solar cell module and the roof surface decreased. Furthermore, the findings indicate that there is a relation between the size of the gap between the roof surface and the solar cell module, and how large initial fire is needed for the fire to spread. A larger distance between the roof surface and the solar module requires a larger initial fire for the fire to spread. The temperature increase inwards in the roof structure was not large enough in the experiments performed to pose a danger of immediate fire spreading inwards in the structure. Work is ongoing internationally on the development of test methods for fire technical documentation of solar cell modules. This work has so far not resulted in new standards or procedures that can be implemented in Norway. Information has been found from various guidelines and reports on what equipment and expertise the fire service needs to secure their efforts. It is important that the fire service has sufficient knowledge about the working principle of a solar cell installation, so that they understand that parts of the installation can conduct electricity, even if the switch-off switch is activated. The fire service must also be given training in how to handle a fire in a building with a solar cell installation, as well as what protective equipment and tools are needed. The answers from the various fire services to a questionnaire show that solar cell installations rarely are included in the risk and vulnerability analyses (ROS analyses). As a consequence, they do not currently have good enough training and knowledge about handling fires in buildings with solar cell installations. The questionnaire also shows that it seems somewhat unclear to the fire service what responsibility they have in the event of a fire in solar cell installations. This should be clarified, and in cases where solar cell installations pose an increased risk, the fire service must be provided with resources so that they have the right equipment, the right competence, and the right staff to handle such fires.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 4.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Glansberg, Karin
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Daaland Wormdahl, Espen
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Jet fires and cryogenic spills: How to document extreme industrial incidents2019Inngår i: Sixth Magdeburg Fire and Explosion Days (MBE2019) conference proceedings, , 2019Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In industrial plants, such as oil platforms, refineries or onboard vessels carrying fuel, a rupture event of a pipeline could have dramatic consequences, as was demonstrated both in the Piper Alpha and Deepwater Horizon accidents. If surfaces are exposed to extreme conditions, both extreme cold (cryogenic spills) and extreme heat (jet fires), this can affect exposed surfaces, and can cause a domino effect of severe events.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 5.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Glansberg, Karin
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Sesseng, Christian
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Storesund, Karolina
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Brandt, Are W.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Energieffektive bygg og brannsikkerhet2019Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 6.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Meraner, Christoph
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Fra bensinstasjon til energistasjon: Endring av brann- og eksplosjonssikkerhet2020Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    From petrol station to multifuel energy station: Changes in fire and explosion safety

    A multifuel energy station is a publicly available station which offers refueling of traditional fossil fuels in combination with one or more alternative energy carriers, such as hydrogen or electric power to electric vehicles. The goal of this study is to survey how the transition from traditional petrol stations to multifuel energy stations affects the fire and explosion risk.

    Relevant research publications, regulations and guidelines have been studied. Four interviews with relevant stakeholders have been conducted, in addition to correspondence with other stakeholders. The collected information has been used to evaluate and provide a general overview of fire and explosion risk at multifuel energy stations. The scope of the project is limited, and some types of fueling facilities (in conjunction with supermarkets, bus- and industrial facilities), some types of safety challenges (intended acts of sabotage and/or terror), as well as transport of fuel to and from the station, are not included.

    Availability of different types of fuel in Norway was investigated and three types were selected to be in focus: power for electric vehicles, gaseous hydrogen, as well as hydrogen and methane in liquid form. The selection was based on expected future use, as well as compatibility with the goal of the National Transport Plan that all new vehicles sold from 2025 should be zero emission vehicles. Currently, the category zero emission vehicle includes only electric- and hydrogen vehicles.

    In facilities that handle flammable, self-reactive, pressurized and explosive substances there is a risk of unwanted incidents. When facilities with hazardous substances comply with current regulations, the risk associated with handling hazardous substances is considered not to be significant compared to other risks in society. When new energy carriers are added, it is central to understand how the transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station will change the fire and explosion risk. Factors that will have an impact include: number and type of ignition sources, number of passenger vehicles and heavy transport vehicles at the station, amount of flammable substances, duration of stay for visitors, complexity of the facility, size of the safety distances, fire service’s extinguishing efforts, environmental impact, maintenance need etc. In addition, each energy carrier entails unique scenarios.

    By introducing charging stations at multifuel energy stations, additional ignition sources are introduced compared to a traditional petrol station, since the charger itself can be considered as a potential ignition source. The charger and connected car must be placed outside the Ex-zone in accordance with NEK400 (processed Norwegian edition of IEC 60364 series, the CENELEC HD 60364 series and some complementary national standards), in such a way that ignition of potential leaks from fossil fuels or other fuels under normal operation conditions is considered unlikely to occur. A potential danger in the use of rapid charging is electric arcing, which can arise due to poor connections and high electric effect. Electric arcs produce local hot spots, which in turn can contribute to fire ignition. The danger of electric arcs is reduced by, among others, communication between the vehicle and charger, which assures that no charging is taking place before establishing good contact between the two. The communication also assures that it is not possible to drive off with the charger still connected. There are requirements for weekly inspections of the charger and the charging cable, which will contribute to quick discovery and subsequent repair of faults and mechanical wear. Other safety measures to reduce risk include collision protection of the charger, and emergency stop switches that cut the power delivery to all chargers. There is a potential danger of personal injury by electric shock, but this is considered most relevant during installation of the charger and can be reduced to an acceptable level by utilizing certified personnel and limited access for unauthorized personnel. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with charging stations, it is important to take into account the added ignition sources, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

    Gaseous hydrogen has different characteristics than conventional fuels at a petrol station, which affect the risk (frequency and consequence). Gaseous hydrogen is flammable, burns quickly and may explode given the right conditions. Furthermore, the gas is stored in high pressure tanks, producing high mechanical rupture energy, and the transport capacity of gaseous hydrogen leads to an increased number of trucks delivering hydrogen, compared with fossil fuels. On the other hand, gaseous hydrogen is light weight and easily rises upwards and dilute. In the case of a fire the flame has low radiant heat and heating outside the flame itself is limited. Important safety measures are open facilities, safe connections for high pressure fueling, and facilitate for pressure relief in a safe direction by the use of valves and sectioning, so that the gas is led upwards in a safe direction in case of a leakage. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with gaseous hydrogen, it is important to take into account the explosion hazard, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

    Liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid methane (LNG, LBG) are stored at very low temperatures and at a relatively low pressure. Leakages may result in cryogenic (very cold) leakages which may lead to personal injuries and embrittlement of materials such as steels. Critical installations which may be exposed to cryogenic leakages must be able to withstand these temperatures. In addition, physical boundaries to limit uncontrolled spreading of leakages should be established. Evaporation from tanks must be ventilated through safety valves. During a fire, the safety valves must not be drenched in extinguishing water, as they may freeze and seal. Leakages of liquid methane and liquid hydrogen will evaporate and form flammable and explosive gas clouds. Liquid hydrogen is kept at such a low temperature that uninsulated surfaces may cause air to condense and form liquid oxygen, which may give an intense fire or explosion when reacting with organic material. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with liquid hydrogen and liquid methane, it is important to take into account the cryogenic temperatures during storage and that it must be possible to ventilate off any gas formed by evaporation from a liquid leakage, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

    For the combination of more than one alternative energy carrier combined with fuels of a conventional petrol station, two areas of challenges have been identified: area challenges and cascade effects. Area challenges are due to the fact that risks to the surroundings must be evaluated based on all activity in the facility. When increasing the number of fueling systems within an area, the frequency of unwanted incidents at a given point in the facility is summarized (simply put). If two energy carriers are placed in too close proximity to each other, the risk can be disproportionately high. During construction, the fueling systems must be placed with sufficient space between them. In densely populated areas, shortage of space may limit the development. Cascade effects is a chain of events which starts small and grows larger, here due to an incident involving one energy carrier spreading to another. This may occur due to ignited liquid leakages which may flow to below a gas tank, or by explosion- or fire related damages to nearby installations due to shock waves, flying debris or flames. Good technical and organizational measures are important, such as sufficient training of personnel, follow-up and facility inspections, especially during start-up after installing a new energy carrier. The transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station could not only give negative cascade effects, since sectionalizing of energy carriers, with lower storage volume per energy carrier, as well as physical separation between these, may give a reduction in the potential extent of damage of each facility. Apart from area challenges and cascade effects no other combination challenges, such a chemical interaction challenges, have been identified to potentially affect the fire and explosion risk.

    For future work it will be important to keep an eye on the development, nationally and internationally, since it is still too early to predict which energy carriers that will be most utilized in the future. If electric heavy transport (larger batteries and the need for fast charging with higher effect) become more common, it will be necessary to develop a plan and evaluate the risks of charging these at multifuel energy stations. For hydrogen there is a need for more knowledge on how the heat of a jet fire (ignited, pressurized leakage) affects impinged objects. There is also a general need for experimental and numerical research on liquid hydrogen and methane due to many knowledge gaps on the topic. During operation of the facilities and through potential unwanted incidents, new knowledge will be gained, and this knowledge must be utilized in order to update recommendations linked to the risk of fire and explosion in multifuel energy stations.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 7.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Meraner, Christoph
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Stölen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    From petrol station to multifuel energy station: Changes in fire and explosion safety2021Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    A multifuel energy station is a publicly available station which offers refueling of traditional fossil fuels in combination with one or more alternative energy carriers, such as hydrogen or electric power to electric vehicles. The goal of this study is to survey how the transition from traditional petrol stations to multifuel energy stations affects the fire and explosion risk. Relevant research publications, regulations and guidelines have been studied. Four interviews with relevant stakeholders have been conducted, in addition to correspondence with other stakeholders. The collected information has been used to evaluate and provide a general overview of fire and explosion risk at multifuel energy stations. The scope of the project is limited, and some types of fueling facilities (in conjunction with supermarkets, bus- and industrial facilities), some types of safety challenges (intended acts of sabotage and/or terror), as well as transport of fuel to and from the station, are not included. Availability of different types of fuel in Norway was investigated and three types were selected to be in focus: power for electric vehicles, gaseous hydrogen, as well as hydrogen and methane in liquid form. The selection was based on expected future use, as well as compatibility with the goal of the National Transport Plan that all new vehicles sold from 2025 should be zero emission vehicles. Currently, the category zero emission vehicle includes only electric- and hydrogen vehicles. In facilities that handle flammable, self-reactive, pressurized and explosive substances there is a risk of unwanted incidents. When facilities with hazardous substances comply with current regulations, the risk associated with handling hazardous substances is considered not to be significant compared to other risks in society. When new energy carriers are added, it is central to understand how the transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station will change the fire and explosion risk. Factors that will have an impact include: number and type of ignition sources, number of passenger vehicles and heavy transport vehicles at the station, amount of flammable substances, duration of stay for visitors, complexity of the facility, size of the safety distances, fire service’s extinguishing efforts, environmental impact, maintenance need etc. In addition, each energy carrier entails unique scenarios. By introducing charging stations at multifuel energy stations, additional ignition sources are introduced compared to a traditional petrol station, since the charger itself can be considered as a potential ignition source. The charger and connected car must be placed outside the Ex-zone in accordance with NEK400 (processed Norwegian edition of IEC 60364 series, the CENELEC HD 60364 series and some complementary national standards), in such a way that ignition of potential leaks from fossil fuels or other fuels under normal operation conditions is considered unlikely to occur. A potential danger in the use of rapid charging is electric arcing, which can arise due to poor connections and high electric effect. Electric arcs produce local hot spots, which in turn can contribute to fire ignition. The danger of electric arcs is reduced by, among others, communication between the vehicle and charger, which assures that no charging is taking place before establishing good contact between the two. The communication also assures that it is not possible to drive off with the charger still connected. There are requirements for weekly inspections of the charger and the charging cable, which will contribute to quick discovery and subsequent repair of faults and mechanical wear. Other safety measures to reduce risk include collision protection of the charger, and emergency stop switches that cut the power delivery to all chargers. There is a potential danger of personal injury by electric shock, but this is considered most relevant during installation of the charger and can be reduced to an acceptable level by utilizing certified personnel and limited access for unauthorized personnel. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with charging stations, it is important to take into account the added ignition sources, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. Gaseous hydrogen has different characteristics than conventional fuels at a petrol station, which affect the risk (frequency and consequence). Gaseous hydrogen is flammable, burns quickly and may explode given the right conditions. Furthermore, the gas is stored in high pressure tanks, producing high mechanical rupture energy, and the transport capacity of gaseous hydrogen leads to an increased number of trucks delivering hydrogen, compared with fossil fuels. On the other hand, gaseous hydrogen is light weight and easily rises upwards and dilute. In the case of a fire the flame has low radiant heat and heating outside the flame itself is limited. Important safety measures are open facilities, safe connections for high pressure fueling, and facilitate for pressure relief in a safe direction by the use of valves and sectioning, so that the gas is led upwards in a safe direction in case of a leakage. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with gaseous hydrogen, it is important to take into account the explosion hazard, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. Liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid methane (LNG, LBG) are stored at very low temperatures and at a relatively low pressure. Leakages may result in cryogenic (very cold) leakages which may lead to personal injuries and embrittlement of materials such as steels. Critical installations which may be exposed to cryogenic leakages must be able to withstand these temperatures. In addition, physical boundaries to limit uncontrolled spreading of leakages should be established. Evaporation from tanks must be ventilated through safety valves. During a fire, the safety valves must not be drenched in extinguishing water, as they may freeze and seal. Leakages of liquid methane and liquid hydrogen will evaporate and form flammable and explosive gas clouds. Liquid hydrogen is kept at such a low temperature that uninsulated surfaces may cause air to condense and form liquid oxygen, which may give an intense fire or explosion when reacting with organic material. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with liquid hydrogen and liquid methane, it is important to take into account the cryogenic temperatures during storage and that it must be possible to ventilate off any gas formed by evaporation from a liquid leakage, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. For the combination of more than one alternative energy carrier combined with fuels of a conventional petrol station, two areas of challenges have been identified: area challenges and cascading effects. Area challenges are due to the fact that risks to the surroundings must be evaluated based on all activity in the facility. When increasing the number of fueling systems within an area, the frequency of unwanted incidents at a given point in the facility is summarized (simply put). If two energy carriers are placed in too close proximity to each other, the risk can be disproportionately high. During construction, the fueling systems must be placed with sufficient space between them. In densely populated areas, shortage of space may limit the development. Cascading effects is a chain of events which starts small and grows larger, here due to an incident involving one energy carrier spreading to another. This may occur due to ignited liquid leakages which may flow to below a gas tank, or by explosion- or fire related damages to nearby installations due to shock waves, flying debris or flames. Good technical and organizational measures are important, such as sufficient training of personnel, follow-up and facility inspections, especially during start-up after installing a new energy carrier. The transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station could not only give negative cascading effects, since sectionalizing of energy carriers, with lower storage volume per energy carrier, as well as physical separation between these, may give a reduction in the potential extent of damage of each facility. Apart from area challenges and cascading effects no other combination challenges, such a chemical interaction challenges, have been identified to potentially affect the fire and explosion risk. For future work it will be important to keep an eye on the development, nationally and internationally, since it is still too early to predict which energy carriers that will be most utilized in the future. If electric heavy transport (larger batteries and the need for fast charging with higher effect) become more common, it will be necessary to develop a plan and evaluate the risks of charging these at multifuel energy stations. For hydrogen there is a need for more knowledge on how the heat of a jet fire (ignited, pressurized leakage) affects impinged objects. There is also a general need for experimental and numerical research on liquid hydrogen and methane due to many knowledge gaps on the topic. During operation of the facilities and through potential unwanted incidents, new knowledge will be gained, and this knowledge must be utilized in order to update recommendations linked to the risk of fire and explosion in multifuel energy stations.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 8.
    Fjærestad, Janne Siren
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Meraner, Christoph
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Jiang, Lei
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Stølen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Brannsikkerhet ved oppføring og rehabilitering av bygg2023Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Fire safety during construction and rehabilitation of buildings. This study deals with how the covering of buildings during the construction or rehabilitation of buildings affects fire safety and to what extent the regulations take this into account. The main focus has been mapping relevant requirements, recommendations, and performances related to the covering of buildings, mapping available materials, investigating the material’s fire properties, and modelling the spread of smoke within the covering. A mapping of the relevant laws and regulations applied for constructing and rehabilitating buildings has been carried out. The mapping has shown that demands are placed on owners, users, project owners, builders, businesses, employers, planners and contractors through many different laws and regulations. The people involved can have several roles, and similar roles have different names in the various regulations. For buildings in use, fire safety must be ensured for both the users and workers. It also applies that both the owner and the users are responsible for ensuring fire safety. It requires good communication and cooperation between different actors to ensure that fire safety is maintained for all involved, during the construction and rehabilitation of buildings. When covered scaffolding is used, the Regulations concerning the performance of work, use of work equipment and related technical requirements [10] require that the covering satisfy the fire requirements for materials used in escape routes (§17-20). The guideline to the Norwegian Regulations on technical requirements for construction works, TEK10, (Veiledningen til TEK10) §11-9, provides pre-accepted performance levels. For escape routes, class B-s1,d0 (In 1) is specified for walls and ceilings. There is no requirement for fire classification of the walkways in the scaffolding under the applicable laws and regulations. We believe there should be requirements for fire classification of the walkways, in the same way as for the covering, i.e., B-s1,d0 (In 1) for surfaces on walls and ceilings and Dfl-s1 (G) for surfaces on floors. The simulations of the spread of smoke from a fire inside a building during construction or rehabilitation show that the spread of smoke is affected when the scaffolding around the building is covered. Covering around the sides leads to a greater horizontal spread of smoke in the scaffolding than without covering. When the cover also has a roof, the smoke first accumulates underneath the cover's roof before it eventually also fills up with smoke down the floors of the scaffolding. The simulations showed that establishing an open field in the upper part of the cover would ventilate the smoke gases effectively, and the spread of smoke was essentially the same as for a cover without a roof. In addition, the simulation indicated that the air flow through the walkways in the scaffold could be an important factor in reducing the covering's negative effect on the spread of smoke. Of the 64 different products used for covering found in the survey, 35% had full classification according to EN 13501-1 (such as B,s1-d0). About 6% stated that the product was not flame retardant. Of the remainder, it was evenly distributed between those who stated a fire classification according to other test methods, those who did not provide any information on the fire properties and those who stated that the product was flame retardant without further specification. The mapping also indicates that the products from market leaders used by large general contractors provide products with documented fire properties. Conversations with two of Norway’s largest fire and rescue services shed light on several challenges connected to covering scaffolding and construction during firefighting activities. They pointed out that the covering could cause challenges and delays throughout their efforts. The covering gives a reduced visual overview of the spread of smoke and the location of doors and windows. This information is important for planning both extinguishing and smoke diver efforts. In addition, the covering can be an obstacle to the actual extinguishing effort, the use of an extinguishing agent and smoke divers and rescue efforts.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 9.
    Garberg Olsø, Brynhild
    et al.
    SINTEF, Norway.
    Stølen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Schjøth Bunkholt, Nora
    SINTEF, Norway.
    Leikanger Friquin, Kathinka
    SINTEF, Norway.
    Hjertnes, Jostein
    SINTEF, Norway.
    Factors Affecting the Fire Safety Design of Photovoltaic Installations Under Performance-Based Regulations in Norway2023Inngår i: Fire technology, ISSN 0015-2684, E-ISSN 1572-8099, Vol. 59, s. 2055-Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The impact of Photovoltaic (PV) installations on the fire safety of buildings must be considered in all building projects where such energy systems are established. The holistic fire safety of the building largely depends on how the fire safety of the PV installation is considered by the different actors during the design and construction process. Research has therefore been undertaken to study how performance-based regulations in combination with the lack of national guidelines affect the overall fire safety considerations for PV installations in Norway. Four factors were found to govern to which extent PV installations are emphasised in the fire safety design phase: (1) whether the building was first of its kind as a pioneering building, (2) whether the building was built before or after the publication of the 2018 revision of the norm NEK 400, (3) The level of knowledge and experience of the fire safety consultant, which in turn affects the use of performance-based engineering tools and the level of detailing in the design and construction phases, and (4) The degree of integration in the building. The main goal of the study is to give an insight and a contribution to the development of in-depth knowledge on how fire safety design for PV installations on buildings is handled in Norway, which may also be relevant to other countries with similar performance-based regulations.

  • 10.
    Jansson McNamee, Robert
    et al.
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research. RISE Research Institutes of Sweden.
    Storesund, Karolina
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    The function of intumescent paint for steel during different fire exposures2016Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In the present study the behaviour of four intumescent systems for steel was investigated experimentally. The main purpose of the study was to determine the behaviour of the systems during different fire scenarios including standardized furnace testing, tests in cone calorimeter and ad hoc tests including ceiling jets and fire plumes. The experimental campaign shows that two of the investigated systems did perform very poorly in the furnace tests compared to what they were designed for, despite being the systems having the best swelling in the cone calorimeter tests. This highlights the importance of adhesion at high temperature for this type of systems. Since adhesion is crucial a more relevant evaluation for this type of systems ought to be a test where the flows around the specimen can be characterized and controlled, i.e. a ceiling jet or a fire plume scenario. This is especially important as steel protected with intumescent systems are often used in large open spaces where local fire plumes and ceiling jets are expected.Key words: intumescent paint, steel, alternative exposure

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 11.
    Jansson, Robert
    et al.
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut.
    Storesund, Karolina
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    Stolen, Reidar
    Brandskyddsfärgers funktion vid olika brandscenarier2016Inngår i: Brandposten, nr 54, s. 37-37Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 12.
    Jansson, Robert
    et al.
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut.
    Storesund, Karolina
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    Nordløkken, Per Gunnar
    RISE., SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    Intumescent paint systems exposed to different heating scenarios2016Inngår i: Interflam 2016: Conference Proceedings, 2016, s. 225-233Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 13.
    Sanfeliu Meliá, Cristina
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Stölen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Aamodt, Edvard
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Steen-Hansen, Anne
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik. NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway.
    Li, Tian
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Energy storage, energy production and SMART technology in buildings2021Inngår i: Proc of Nordic Fire and Safety Days 2021, 2021, s. 63-Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Modern buildings are being built with increasingly complex technical installations and energy systems. The introduction of renewable energy production, like photovoltaic (PV) panels on building roofs and facades and an increasing number of connected electric appliances, changes the way the electric power is distributed from production to end-user. The difference in production and demand for energy over time also gives incentives for installing energy storage systems. Electric energy can be stored in batteries, transferred into hydrogen gas via electrolysis or stored as thermal energy for use later. The current work presents an overview of an ongoing study in the Fire Research and Innovation Centre (FRIC), on fire safety implications related to implementing new technology for energy storage and production. The focus is on the built environment such as dwellings and office buildings situated in the Nordic countries. This study builds on previous studies of related topics

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 14.
    Stolen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Heat flux in jet fires: New method for measuring the heat flux levels of jet fires2018Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Jet fires are ignited leakages of pressurized liquid or gaseous fuel. In jet fire testing for the offshore industry, heat flux is the defining factor for the accidental loads. NORSOK S001 [1] defines two different heat flux levels of 250 kW/m2 and 350 kW/m2 depending on the leak rate of hydrocarbons. These heat flux levels are used in risk analysis and define what type of fire load bearing structures and critical equipment need to be able to resist in a given area. Examples of such ratings can be “250 kW/m2 jet fire for 60 minutes”, “350 kW/m2 jet fire for 15 minutes” or any other combination based on calculations in the risk assessment. Combined with critical temperatures this defines the performance criteria for the passive fire protection. Each configuration of the passive fire protection needs to be tested and verified. Manufacturers of passive fire protection request fire tests to document their performance against jet fires with these various heat flux levels. The challenge is that the standard for testing passive fire protection against jet fires [2] does not define any heat flux level or any method to define or measure it. We have developed a method for defining and measuring the heat flux levels in jet fires. This method can be used when faced with the challenge of testing passive fire protection against specific levels of heat flux. The method includes a custom test rig that allows jet fire testing with different heat flux levels. A large number of tests have been performed to verify the reproducibility and repeatability of the method. Heat flux is defined as the flow of energy through a surface. The heat flux from a fire to an engulfed surface of an object is dependent on both the engulfing flame and the properties of the surface. The properties of the surface may change during the exposure to the flame as it heats up and changes its surface properties. At some point the object inside the flame will reach a thermal equilibrium with the flame where the net flow of energy into the object is balanced by the energy emitted from the object. The heat flux for an object can be calculated as incident heat flux, emitted heat flux or net heat flux. A definition of heat flux needs to include parameters of the receiving object. These variations give a lot of degrees of freedom when calculating heat flux in a fire. Special water cooled gauges are designed to measure heat flux to a cooled surface, but these have proved to be very unreliable when placed inside a large fire. A more robust and easily defined method is to measure the equilibrium temperature inside an object placed inside the flame. This is the principle used in plate thermocouples used in fire resistance furnace testing [3]. In our experience, these plate thermocouples are often damaged during high heat flux jet fire tests. This raises questions to how long into the tests such measurements are reliable. Several other types of objects have been tested and the most convenient and reliable type was found to be simply a small 8 mm steel tube that is sealed in the end and has a thermocouple inside. One key difference between this small tube thermocouple and the plate thermocouple is that the plate thermocouple is directional and the tube is omnidirectional. Current works and tests will optimize the measuring objects in order to get the most relevant equilibrium temperature while still maintaining the robustness of the sensor during the test. The suggested heat flux calculation is to follow the Stefan-Boltzmann relation of temperature and heat flux. For a black body this gives 350 kW/m2 for 1303 °C and 250 kW/m2 for 1176 °C. A lower emissivity may be defined for the surface of the sensing object giving higher temperatures for the same flux levels. This method gives a simple, robust and reproducible correlation between heat flux levels and temperatures that can be measured during jet fire tests. The method does not differ between the varying convective and radiative heat transfer in the flame, but it is a representative measurement for the temperature that an object would reach when placed inside the flame.

  • 15.
    Stolen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Glansberg, Karin
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Daaland Wormdahl, Espen
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Heat flux in jet fires : Unified method for measuring the heat flux levels of jet fires2018Inngår i: Nordic Fire and Safety Days (NFSD2018) Conference proceedings (with peer-review),, 2018Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Passive fire protection materials are used to protect critical structures against the heat from fires. In process plants with pressurized combustible substances there may be a risk of jet fires. Through risk analysis the severity of these jet fires is determined and these result in fire resistance requirements with different heat flux levels for different segments. The relevant test standard for fire resistance against jet fires does not include any measurements or definitions of the heat flux in the test flame which the tested object is exposed to. This paper presents methods for reaching different heat flux levels and how to measure them in a jet fire with limited deviations from the established jet fire test standard.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 16.
    Stolen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Stensaas, Reidar
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Solcelleteknologi og brannsikkerhet2018Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [no]

    Bruken av solcelleteknologi er i stor vekst i Norge. I denne studien er branntekniske utfordringer ved bruk av solcelleteknologi undersøkt, med hensyn på brannstart, brannspredning og brannslokking. Studien danner et kunnskapsgrunnlag for å ivareta brannsikkerheten under montering, drift og under slokkeinnsats, samt for å utforme et enhetlig og tydelig regelverk. Resultatene fra studien viser:

    Brannstart: Solcelleinstallasjoner inneholder mange koblingspunkt, som kan være potensielle tennkilder, og en liten mengde brennbare materialer. Dermed er det som trengs til stede for å starte en brann. Det er viktig at alle kontaktpunkter i solcelleinstallasjonen er robuste og tåler den påkjenningen de blir utsatt for gjennom sin levetid uten at det oppstår dårlig kontakt som kan føre til brann.

    Brannspredning: For utenpåmonterte solcellemoduler er det ofte en åpen luftspalte mellom modul og bygning. Dersom det er en brann i denne luftspalten, vil varmen kunne bli akkumulert, noe som kan føre til raskere og større brannspredning enn om bygningsoverflaten ikke hadde vært tildekket. I fullskalaforsøk med solcellemoduler montert på tak spredte brannen seg under hele arealet som var dekket av moduler, men stoppet da den nærmet seg kanten av dette arealet. Dette illustrerer viktigheten av at områder med solceller utenpå en bygning blir seksjonert for å unngå brannspredning. Eventuelt kan det benyttes mindre brennbare materialer på taket under solcellemodulene for å motvirke den økte varmepåkjenningen som solcellemodulene gir. Luftspalten mellom modul og bygning kan potensielt også gi endringer i luftstrømningen langs bygget, som igjen kan påvirke brannspredningen.

    Brannslokking: Brannvesenet har behov for informasjon om det er solcelleinstallasjon i bygget og hvilke deler av det elektriske anlegget som kan være spenningssatt. Under slokkeinnsats må brannvesenet ta hensyn til berøringsfare, og fare for at det kan oppstå lysbuer og andre feil som kan føre til nye antennelsespunkt. Ferskvann kan brukes som slokkemiddel, dette må spyles fra minimum 1 meters avstand med spredt stråle og minimum 5 meters avstand med samlet stråle. Solcellemoduler kan komplisere brannslokking ved at de danner en fysisk barriere mellom brannvesenet og brannen, samt fordi det må tas hensyn til plassering av spenningssatte komponenter. Når disse punktene er tatt høyde for, bør ikke utenpåmonterte solcelleinstallasjoner være et problem.

    Videre arbeid: For utenpåmonterte solcelleinstallasjoner, er det lite forskning på vertikal montering (på fasader), og hvordan en eventuell endret branndynamikk kan påvirke brannspredning og slokking. Videre er det i dag økende bruk av bygningsintegrerte solcelleinstallasjoner, noe som gir mange mulige nye utfordringer for brannsikkerheten og for regelverk, ettersom solcellen da er en del av bygningskroppen, samtidig som den er en elektrisk komponent. Tysk statistikk tyder på at brannrisiko for slike installasjoner kan være større enn for utenpåmonterte solcelleinstallasjoner, og dette vil det derfor være viktig å undersøke nærmere.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    RISE-rapport2018_31_Solcellete_Brann
  • 17.
    Stolen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brandteknik.
    BRAVENT – Tetting av ventilasjonsfilter med brannrøyk2021Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In the series of BRAVENT projects, the goal is to generate documentation and answers  to issues related to ventilation and fire by investigating these experimentally.  

    In ventilation systems where the smoke will be extracted through the ventilation system in the event of a fire, it is common practice to install so-called bypass solutions to send the smoke past the ventilation filter in the event of a fire. This is done to avoid clogging the filters with smoke particulates and maintain the airflow through the ventilation ducts. If the airflow in the ventilation system stops, smoke can spread freely in the ventilation ducts between different fire cells. For ventilation systems that will be stopped and sealed by fire rated dampers, this challenge is not relevant. 

    Even though this is a common solution, it has been difficult to find documentation that ventilation filters can be clogged by smoke from a fire. As part of BRAVENT, RISE Fire Research has conducted two test series to investigate this problem by drawing fire smoke through a ventilation filter and measuring how quickly the filter clogs. 

    In most experiments that were carried out, it took about an hour before the filter was clogged, but there were also experiments where the filter was clogged within a few minutes. This shows that there can be a big difference in how efficiently fire smoke can clog a ventilation filter, but that under certain conditions this can happen very quickly. For example, an experiment where a small amount of polyether foam was burned in addition to wood showed that the filter was clogged quickly. This shows that the clogging rate is highly dependent on the type of fuel. However, in another test where only wood was burned, the filter was clogged in a similar time frame, indicating that also other factors than the fuel are important. It is thus necessary to secure the smoke an alternative route outside the filter if it is necessary to maintain a certain amount of air in the ventilation system in the event of a fire since the ventilation filter can become clogged within a few minutes.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 18.
    Storesund, Karolina
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Steen-Hansen, Anne
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Bøe, Andreas G.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Fire Research Norge.
    Gjøsund, Gudveig
    NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway.
    Halvorsen, Kristin
    NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway.
    Almklov, Petter G.
    NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway.
    Rett tiltak på rett sted: Forebyggende og målrettede tekniske og organisatoriske tiltak mot dødsbranner i risikogrupper2015Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [no]

    Personer som på ulike måter kan kategoriseres som sårbare, er overrepresentert i dødsbrannstatistikken. Derfor er det viktig å finne fram til effektive og målrettede tiltak som kan forhindre framtidige dødsbranner der personer som tilhører det som omtales som sårbare grupper er involvert. I rapporten brukes en helhetlig analytisk tilnærming som skal fange opp mangfoldet av dimensjoner som kan påvirke forebygging av dødsbrann, og hvordan disse virker i samspill med hverandre. Prosjektet har operert med en forståelse av sårbarhet som inkluderer både det fysiske miljøet, de menneskelige behovene og de sosiale og organisatoriske omgivelsene. En del av rapporten retter seg mot tekniske løsninger som kan brukes for å forbedre brannsikkerheten til sårbare grupper. Det har vært et mål å finne ut hvordan organisatoriske og tekniske tiltak kan brukes og ses i sammenheng, og hvordan tekniske tiltak kan implementeres, vurderes og dokumenteres.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 19.
    Stölen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Fjærestad, Janne Siren
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    EBOB – Solcelleinstallasjonar på bygg: Eksperimentell studie av brannspreiing i holrom bak solcellemodular på skrå takflater2022Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    EBOB - Solar cell installations on buildings. Experimental study of fire spread in cavity behind solar cell modules on pitched roof surfaces.

    This report describes a total of 29 experiments where the fire spread in the cavity behind solar cell modules on pitched roof surfaces were studied. The experiments were performed at RISE Fire Research's laboratory in Trondheim in 2021. The series of experiments was carried out to investigate how a fire on a pitched roof surface will be affected by the presence of solar cell modules installed parallel to the roof surface. Simulated steel solar cell modules were used for all experiments. In a small-scale experimental setup, it was studied how different distances (6, 9, 12 and 15 cm) between the simulated solar cell module and the roof surface affect the fire spread at two different wind speeds (2 and 4 m/s). In a medium-scale experimental setup, it was studied how the fire spread was affected by the size of the initial fire. Finally, in a large-scale experimental setup, it was studied how the fire spread occurs on a roof surface with dimensions in the same order of magnitude as for a roof on a small house. The results show that solar cell modules mounted parallel to the roof surface on pitched roofs can affect the fire dynamics of a fire on the roof surface. The findings from the experiments indicate that there is a correlation between the distance from the roof surface to the solar cell module and how large initial fire is needed for the fire to spread. In the small-scale experiments with a small initial fire, it was not found that the simulated solar cell module affected the extent of damage when the distance between the module and the roof surface was greater than 9 cm. For experiments performed in an intermediate-scale setup, it was found that with a larger initial fire, the fire could spread even when there was 12 cm between the roof surface and the simulated solar cell module. The two large-scale experiments also showed fire spread under the simulated solar cell modules with a UL crib (a standardized fire source) used as the initial fire. The extent of the damaged area on the roof surface was similar for the two experiments, even though the wind direction was different. In both experiments, the fire spread below two rows of simulated solar modules and all the way to the ridge. The heat transfer inwards in the roof construction were greater in the experiments with a simulated solar cell module present than without. It increases with a reduced distance between the roof surface and the simulated solar cell module. Directly below the initial fire, no substantially increased thermal stress was observed on the underlying structure when a simulated solar cell module was installed. The thermal stress, on the other hand, increased to a greater extent because of the fire on the roof surface becoming more extensive when the simulated solar cell module was installed. There was a relatively low temperature increase measured under the chipboard behind the roof covering, which indicates that there was no immediate danger of fire spreading inwards into the roof structure directly through the 22 mm thick chipboard.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 20.
    Stølen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Bergius, Mikael
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Fjærestad, Janne Siren
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Brann i holrom bak royaloljebehandla kledning av furu2022Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This report contains measurements, observations, and results from 30 experiments with fire in the cavity between the wood cladding and the wind barrier. The experiments were performed at RISE Fire Research's laboratory in Trondheim in 2021. The main focus of the study is on fire inside the cavity between the wind barrier and the cladding. The purpose has been to investigate how different parameters, such as material use and geometry, affect the fire in this cavity. This test series is done by using varying combinations of royal oil-treated and untreated cladding of pine with wind barriers of two different reaction to fire classifications and two different lathing types in the various experiments The various experimental setups have been done in a way that is meant to represent typical constructions in Norwegian houses with wooden cladding. All walls were flat, with cladding without gaps or openings and without internal corners, extruding parts, doors, windows, or other penetrations. In most experiments, measures were taken to shield the outside of the cladding from exposure to the initial fire. In several experiments, however, the fire also established itself on the outside of the cladding after it had burned through the cladding from the inside. Large-scale experiments have also been carried out, where both the cavity and the front of the cladding were exposed to the initial fire. The experiments' results show that the use of royal oil-treated cladding had no statistically significant effect on how the fire in the cavity spread. The results indicate that the use of the used wind barrier with reaction to fire classification F lead to faster flame spread and temperature rise than the used wind barrier with fire classification A2 did, but this is not statistically significant and may be due to random variations. Experiments with vertical lathing showed faster temperature rise in the cavity than experiments with cross-lathing. This means that the heat spreads faster upwards in the cavity when it forms continuous vertical channels than where the cavity is connected both horizontally and vertically between the cross-lathing. In the cavity with cross-lathing, on the other hand, the heat and fire spread to a greater extent laterally than in the cavity with only vertical lathing. The fire in the cavity was in many of the experiments limited by oxygen supply. This shows that the supply of air in the cavity can be as crucial for delimiting the fire spread as the fire properties of the materials inside the cavity. When the cavity fire is delimited by the oxygen supply, higher amounts of combustible gases will be formed in the smoke. This can cause the fire to spread to other places if this gas can be re-ignited.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 21.
    Stølen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet. NTNU, Norway.
    Li, Tian
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Wingdahl, Trond
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Steen-Hansen, Anne
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet. NTNU, Norway.
    Large- and small-scale fire test of a building integrated photovoltaic (BIPV) facade system2024Inngår i: Fire safety journal, ISSN 0379-7112, E-ISSN 1873-7226, Vol. 144, artikkel-id 104083Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The number of installed photovoltaic (PV) modules has increased significantly over the last years, and using available building surfaces to generate electricity by integrating PV modules in the construction is an attractive option. Building integrated photovoltaics (BIPV) or other vented claddings can spread fires rapidly to large parts of a building if the fire is allowed to propagate. To investigate this hazard, a large-scale SP FIRE 105 façade fire test was conducted. A façade measuring 4000 mm × 6000 mm covered with BIPV modules was exposed to flames that represent the fire plume from a window in a room at flashover. The results from the test show that critical failures, like falling objects and vertical flame propagation, can be expected in such constructions. These results highlight the importance of details in mounting of BIPV-façades and to require proper documentation from relevant fire tests of such systems. Small-scale cone calorimeter tests were conducted on the studied BIPV module to provide material properties of the combustible parts of the installation. These aspects should be considered when planning new or when retrofitting façades, to prevent escalation of fires. The results presented are, however, only valid for the configuration that was tested. Other BIPV-façades should also be investigated to study how these constructions can be built safely in the future with regard to critical details.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 22.
    Stølen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Li, Tian
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Wingdahl, Trond
    Steen-Hansen, Anne
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Large-scalefire test of a BIPV façadesystem2023Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 23.
    Stølen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Sanfeliu Meliá, Cristina
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Säkerhet och transport, Brand och Säkerhet.
    Fire safety of energy storage and energy production in buildings2022Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    Different technologies for the production and storage of energy are available. The use of renewable energy sources can have both practical, economic, and environmental advantages. However, as renewable energy sources may not be continuously available or in sync with the consumption of energy, the need for energy storage solutions arises. Each building has its characteristic conditions with respect to the availability of renewable energy sources and energy requirements. Moreover, the different types of energy production technologies have different characteristic properties like space requirements, power capacity, investment, and operation cost, etc. Similarly, the energy storage solutions have different energy efficiencies, power and energy capacities, space requirements, and long-term energy loss. Finally, all these energy solutions may lead to different fire hazards that need to be handled in accordance with the building and the environment where the technology will be used. In this report, a short introduction to the following energy production and storage technologies is given: Solar, wind, electric generators, biomass, batteries, hydrogen, thermal, pressurised air, and flywheel rotational energy. Each of these technologies has different characteristics and fire hazards that are mentioned. Smart technology is here defined as any device that can collect information on its environment, evaluate the collected information, and provide some type of output based on the evaluation. A long list of possible input parameters, processing possibilities, and output signals or actions are possible, and any combination of these can be implemented, making a plethora of smart technologies possible. Some of these smart technologies can have an impact on fire safety in buildings. A well-known example is a smoke alarm where the signal from a smoke sensor is compared to a set threshold level that activates an audible alarm. Some example systems are also mentioned to show how different combinations of these solutions can be implemented to cover a specific energy requirement in a building.

    Fulltekst (pdf)
    fulltext
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