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  • 1.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Glansberg, Karin
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Sesseng, Christian
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Storesund, Karolina
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Brandt, Are W.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Energieffektive bygg og brannsikkerhet2019Report (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 2.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    Meraner, Christoph
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    Stolen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    Fra bensinstasjon til energistasjon: Endring av brann- og eksplosjonssikkerhet2020Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    From petrol station to multifuel energy station: Changes in fire and explosion safety

    A multifuel energy station is a publicly available station which offers refueling of traditional fossil fuels in combination with one or more alternative energy carriers, such as hydrogen or electric power to electric vehicles. The goal of this study is to survey how the transition from traditional petrol stations to multifuel energy stations affects the fire and explosion risk.

    Relevant research publications, regulations and guidelines have been studied. Four interviews with relevant stakeholders have been conducted, in addition to correspondence with other stakeholders. The collected information has been used to evaluate and provide a general overview of fire and explosion risk at multifuel energy stations. The scope of the project is limited, and some types of fueling facilities (in conjunction with supermarkets, bus- and industrial facilities), some types of safety challenges (intended acts of sabotage and/or terror), as well as transport of fuel to and from the station, are not included.

    Availability of different types of fuel in Norway was investigated and three types were selected to be in focus: power for electric vehicles, gaseous hydrogen, as well as hydrogen and methane in liquid form. The selection was based on expected future use, as well as compatibility with the goal of the National Transport Plan that all new vehicles sold from 2025 should be zero emission vehicles. Currently, the category zero emission vehicle includes only electric- and hydrogen vehicles.

    In facilities that handle flammable, self-reactive, pressurized and explosive substances there is a risk of unwanted incidents. When facilities with hazardous substances comply with current regulations, the risk associated with handling hazardous substances is considered not to be significant compared to other risks in society. When new energy carriers are added, it is central to understand how the transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station will change the fire and explosion risk. Factors that will have an impact include: number and type of ignition sources, number of passenger vehicles and heavy transport vehicles at the station, amount of flammable substances, duration of stay for visitors, complexity of the facility, size of the safety distances, fire service’s extinguishing efforts, environmental impact, maintenance need etc. In addition, each energy carrier entails unique scenarios.

    By introducing charging stations at multifuel energy stations, additional ignition sources are introduced compared to a traditional petrol station, since the charger itself can be considered as a potential ignition source. The charger and connected car must be placed outside the Ex-zone in accordance with NEK400 (processed Norwegian edition of IEC 60364 series, the CENELEC HD 60364 series and some complementary national standards), in such a way that ignition of potential leaks from fossil fuels or other fuels under normal operation conditions is considered unlikely to occur. A potential danger in the use of rapid charging is electric arcing, which can arise due to poor connections and high electric effect. Electric arcs produce local hot spots, which in turn can contribute to fire ignition. The danger of electric arcs is reduced by, among others, communication between the vehicle and charger, which assures that no charging is taking place before establishing good contact between the two. The communication also assures that it is not possible to drive off with the charger still connected. There are requirements for weekly inspections of the charger and the charging cable, which will contribute to quick discovery and subsequent repair of faults and mechanical wear. Other safety measures to reduce risk include collision protection of the charger, and emergency stop switches that cut the power delivery to all chargers. There is a potential danger of personal injury by electric shock, but this is considered most relevant during installation of the charger and can be reduced to an acceptable level by utilizing certified personnel and limited access for unauthorized personnel. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with charging stations, it is important to take into account the added ignition sources, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

    Gaseous hydrogen has different characteristics than conventional fuels at a petrol station, which affect the risk (frequency and consequence). Gaseous hydrogen is flammable, burns quickly and may explode given the right conditions. Furthermore, the gas is stored in high pressure tanks, producing high mechanical rupture energy, and the transport capacity of gaseous hydrogen leads to an increased number of trucks delivering hydrogen, compared with fossil fuels. On the other hand, gaseous hydrogen is light weight and easily rises upwards and dilute. In the case of a fire the flame has low radiant heat and heating outside the flame itself is limited. Important safety measures are open facilities, safe connections for high pressure fueling, and facilitate for pressure relief in a safe direction by the use of valves and sectioning, so that the gas is led upwards in a safe direction in case of a leakage. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with gaseous hydrogen, it is important to take into account the explosion hazard, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

    Liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid methane (LNG, LBG) are stored at very low temperatures and at a relatively low pressure. Leakages may result in cryogenic (very cold) leakages which may lead to personal injuries and embrittlement of materials such as steels. Critical installations which may be exposed to cryogenic leakages must be able to withstand these temperatures. In addition, physical boundaries to limit uncontrolled spreading of leakages should be established. Evaporation from tanks must be ventilated through safety valves. During a fire, the safety valves must not be drenched in extinguishing water, as they may freeze and seal. Leakages of liquid methane and liquid hydrogen will evaporate and form flammable and explosive gas clouds. Liquid hydrogen is kept at such a low temperature that uninsulated surfaces may cause air to condense and form liquid oxygen, which may give an intense fire or explosion when reacting with organic material. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with liquid hydrogen and liquid methane, it is important to take into account the cryogenic temperatures during storage and that it must be possible to ventilate off any gas formed by evaporation from a liquid leakage, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

    For the combination of more than one alternative energy carrier combined with fuels of a conventional petrol station, two areas of challenges have been identified: area challenges and cascade effects. Area challenges are due to the fact that risks to the surroundings must be evaluated based on all activity in the facility. When increasing the number of fueling systems within an area, the frequency of unwanted incidents at a given point in the facility is summarized (simply put). If two energy carriers are placed in too close proximity to each other, the risk can be disproportionately high. During construction, the fueling systems must be placed with sufficient space between them. In densely populated areas, shortage of space may limit the development. Cascade effects is a chain of events which starts small and grows larger, here due to an incident involving one energy carrier spreading to another. This may occur due to ignited liquid leakages which may flow to below a gas tank, or by explosion- or fire related damages to nearby installations due to shock waves, flying debris or flames. Good technical and organizational measures are important, such as sufficient training of personnel, follow-up and facility inspections, especially during start-up after installing a new energy carrier. The transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station could not only give negative cascade effects, since sectionalizing of energy carriers, with lower storage volume per energy carrier, as well as physical separation between these, may give a reduction in the potential extent of damage of each facility. Apart from area challenges and cascade effects no other combination challenges, such a chemical interaction challenges, have been identified to potentially affect the fire and explosion risk.

    For future work it will be important to keep an eye on the development, nationally and internationally, since it is still too early to predict which energy carriers that will be most utilized in the future. If electric heavy transport (larger batteries and the need for fast charging with higher effect) become more common, it will be necessary to develop a plan and evaluate the risks of charging these at multifuel energy stations. For hydrogen there is a need for more knowledge on how the heat of a jet fire (ignited, pressurized leakage) affects impinged objects. There is also a general need for experimental and numerical research on liquid hydrogen and methane due to many knowledge gaps on the topic. During operation of the facilities and through potential unwanted incidents, new knowledge will be gained, and this knowledge must be utilized in order to update recommendations linked to the risk of fire and explosion in multifuel energy stations.

    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 3.
    Fjellgaard Mikalsen, Ragni
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    Meraner, Christoph
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    Stölen, Reidar
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    From petrol station to multifuel energy station: Changes in fire and explosion safety2021Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A multifuel energy station is a publicly available station which offers refueling of traditional fossil fuels in combination with one or more alternative energy carriers, such as hydrogen or electric power to electric vehicles. The goal of this study is to survey how the transition from traditional petrol stations to multifuel energy stations affects the fire and explosion risk. Relevant research publications, regulations and guidelines have been studied. Four interviews with relevant stakeholders have been conducted, in addition to correspondence with other stakeholders. The collected information has been used to evaluate and provide a general overview of fire and explosion risk at multifuel energy stations. The scope of the project is limited, and some types of fueling facilities (in conjunction with supermarkets, bus- and industrial facilities), some types of safety challenges (intended acts of sabotage and/or terror), as well as transport of fuel to and from the station, are not included. Availability of different types of fuel in Norway was investigated and three types were selected to be in focus: power for electric vehicles, gaseous hydrogen, as well as hydrogen and methane in liquid form. The selection was based on expected future use, as well as compatibility with the goal of the National Transport Plan that all new vehicles sold from 2025 should be zero emission vehicles. Currently, the category zero emission vehicle includes only electric- and hydrogen vehicles. In facilities that handle flammable, self-reactive, pressurized and explosive substances there is a risk of unwanted incidents. When facilities with hazardous substances comply with current regulations, the risk associated with handling hazardous substances is considered not to be significant compared to other risks in society. When new energy carriers are added, it is central to understand how the transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station will change the fire and explosion risk. Factors that will have an impact include: number and type of ignition sources, number of passenger vehicles and heavy transport vehicles at the station, amount of flammable substances, duration of stay for visitors, complexity of the facility, size of the safety distances, fire service’s extinguishing efforts, environmental impact, maintenance need etc. In addition, each energy carrier entails unique scenarios. By introducing charging stations at multifuel energy stations, additional ignition sources are introduced compared to a traditional petrol station, since the charger itself can be considered as a potential ignition source. The charger and connected car must be placed outside the Ex-zone in accordance with NEK400 (processed Norwegian edition of IEC 60364 series, the CENELEC HD 60364 series and some complementary national standards), in such a way that ignition of potential leaks from fossil fuels or other fuels under normal operation conditions is considered unlikely to occur. A potential danger in the use of rapid charging is electric arcing, which can arise due to poor connections and high electric effect. Electric arcs produce local hot spots, which in turn can contribute to fire ignition. The danger of electric arcs is reduced by, among others, communication between the vehicle and charger, which assures that no charging is taking place before establishing good contact between the two. The communication also assures that it is not possible to drive off with the charger still connected. There are requirements for weekly inspections of the charger and the charging cable, which will contribute to quick discovery and subsequent repair of faults and mechanical wear. Other safety measures to reduce risk include collision protection of the charger, and emergency stop switches that cut the power delivery to all chargers. There is a potential danger of personal injury by electric shock, but this is considered most relevant during installation of the charger and can be reduced to an acceptable level by utilizing certified personnel and limited access for unauthorized personnel. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with charging stations, it is important to take into account the added ignition sources, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. Gaseous hydrogen has different characteristics than conventional fuels at a petrol station, which affect the risk (frequency and consequence). Gaseous hydrogen is flammable, burns quickly and may explode given the right conditions. Furthermore, the gas is stored in high pressure tanks, producing high mechanical rupture energy, and the transport capacity of gaseous hydrogen leads to an increased number of trucks delivering hydrogen, compared with fossil fuels. On the other hand, gaseous hydrogen is light weight and easily rises upwards and dilute. In the case of a fire the flame has low radiant heat and heating outside the flame itself is limited. Important safety measures are open facilities, safe connections for high pressure fueling, and facilitate for pressure relief in a safe direction by the use of valves and sectioning, so that the gas is led upwards in a safe direction in case of a leakage. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with gaseous hydrogen, it is important to take into account the explosion hazard, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. Liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid methane (LNG, LBG) are stored at very low temperatures and at a relatively low pressure. Leakages may result in cryogenic (very cold) leakages which may lead to personal injuries and embrittlement of materials such as steels. Critical installations which may be exposed to cryogenic leakages must be able to withstand these temperatures. In addition, physical boundaries to limit uncontrolled spreading of leakages should be established. Evaporation from tanks must be ventilated through safety valves. During a fire, the safety valves must not be drenched in extinguishing water, as they may freeze and seal. Leakages of liquid methane and liquid hydrogen will evaporate and form flammable and explosive gas clouds. Liquid hydrogen is kept at such a low temperature that uninsulated surfaces may cause air to condense and form liquid oxygen, which may give an intense fire or explosion when reacting with organic material. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with liquid hydrogen and liquid methane, it is important to take into account the cryogenic temperatures during storage and that it must be possible to ventilate off any gas formed by evaporation from a liquid leakage, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. For the combination of more than one alternative energy carrier combined with fuels of a conventional petrol station, two areas of challenges have been identified: area challenges and cascading effects. Area challenges are due to the fact that risks to the surroundings must be evaluated based on all activity in the facility. When increasing the number of fueling systems within an area, the frequency of unwanted incidents at a given point in the facility is summarized (simply put). If two energy carriers are placed in too close proximity to each other, the risk can be disproportionately high. During construction, the fueling systems must be placed with sufficient space between them. In densely populated areas, shortage of space may limit the development. Cascading effects is a chain of events which starts small and grows larger, here due to an incident involving one energy carrier spreading to another. This may occur due to ignited liquid leakages which may flow to below a gas tank, or by explosion- or fire related damages to nearby installations due to shock waves, flying debris or flames. Good technical and organizational measures are important, such as sufficient training of personnel, follow-up and facility inspections, especially during start-up after installing a new energy carrier. The transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station could not only give negative cascading effects, since sectionalizing of energy carriers, with lower storage volume per energy carrier, as well as physical separation between these, may give a reduction in the potential extent of damage of each facility. Apart from area challenges and cascading effects no other combination challenges, such a chemical interaction challenges, have been identified to potentially affect the fire and explosion risk. For future work it will be important to keep an eye on the development, nationally and internationally, since it is still too early to predict which energy carriers that will be most utilized in the future. If electric heavy transport (larger batteries and the need for fast charging with higher effect) become more common, it will be necessary to develop a plan and evaluate the risks of charging these at multifuel energy stations. For hydrogen there is a need for more knowledge on how the heat of a jet fire (ignited, pressurized leakage) affects impinged objects. There is also a general need for experimental and numerical research on liquid hydrogen and methane due to many knowledge gaps on the topic. During operation of the facilities and through potential unwanted incidents, new knowledge will be gained, and this knowledge must be utilized in order to update recommendations linked to the risk of fire and explosion in multifuel energy stations.

    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 4.
    Hox, Kristian
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Slokkemetoder med lite vann2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [no]

    SP Fire Research har i samarbeid med Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (DSB), Regionalt forskningsfond Midt-Norge og Norsk brannbefals landsforbund (NBLF), utført et prosjekt for å få en bedre kunnskapsoversikt over nye slokkeverktøy både med hensyn på effekt, og hvor utbredt de er. Gjennom ulike aktiviteter kan prosjektet konkludere med følgende:Resultater fra en spørreundersøkelse avdekker at brannvesen i Norge har god kjennskap til nye slokkeverktøy, som CAFS og skjærslokker, men de blir i liten grad benyttet. Dette kan til en viss grad knyttes opp mot utilstrekkelig opplæring og manglende erfaring med utstyret. Videre indikerer tester at utvendig slokkeinnsats kan senke temperaturen i et brannrom betydelig, og eventuelt slokke brannen, dersom denne innsatsen blir utført i nærheten av brannen. Skjærslokkeren ble vurdert til å være det beste alternativet for å håndtere hulromsbranner. Resultatene viser også at det er mulig å designe gode testmetoder for å sammenligne ulike slokkerverktøy.

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  • 5.
    Sesseng, Christian
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Storesund, Karolina
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Meraner, Christoph
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Utvendig brannbekjempelse i Midtbykvartalet – En mulighetsstudie2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    External fire-fighting in Midtbykvartalet – A feasibility study

    The property developer E. C. Dahls Eiendom (ECDE) plans a building complex in a quarter in the city centre in Trondheim, the "Midtbykvartalet". The building will be enclosed by existing building blocks which to varying degrees hinder the fire service's access and efforts. Also, since the new building is intended for residential purposes, it will be necessary to install windows in fire rated walls against adjacent building. These factors result in deviations from a number of performance requirements in the guidelines to the regulations on technical requirements for construction works and there is therefore a need to find alternative solutions. It must be documented that these alternative solutions have at least as good an effect on fire safety as pre-accepted solutions would have. A potential side-effect of new, alternative solutions is that these can also, to some extent, protect the existing wooden buildings in the quarter.

    The aim of this report has been to identify the state-of-the-art within active fire protection measures for external fire-fighting and to obtain an overview of existing solutions and manufacturers and to carry out an assessment of the potential of these solutions.

    Risk scenarios

    An overview of existing buildings in the Midtbykvartalet is presented as well as an overall description of the plans for development. Based on this, several scenarios have been identified to reveal the potential fire-spread hazard between the existing buildings and the planned building. Furthermore, a qualitative risk assessment has been carried out.

    A literature study describes the state-of-the-art in water-based extinguishing systems for outdoor use. It deals with fixed extinguishers (facade sprinklers, water curtains), dynamic extinguishers, foam extinguishers, fire gels, as well as with sprinkler systems' effect and reliability. Furthermore, existing solutions (e.g. facade sprinklers, water curtains, water cannons and water mist turbines) have been surveyed, existing documentation described and assessed regarding suitability for use in the Midtbykvartalet.

    From the identified scenarios, it appears that fires in existing buildings are more likely to spread to the new building than a fire from the new building to existing buildings. The greatest danger to the new building will be if a fire spreads in existing buildings, up through the roof, through windows or along the facade to the roof. In many cases, the fire service will have good access with their ladder trucks etc. to perform extinguishing efforts, at least in the early phase of the fire. But the risk of rapid internal fire spread, which may include several of the older buildings, can create a challenging situation for the fire service and a risk for the new building. In case of fire spread to the new building, the fire department will, due to the position and height of the building, have difficulty with aerial rescue and evacuation from the new building's higher floors.

    Concept for the Midtbykvartalet

    A combination of a static and a dynamic extinguishing system will provide the best balance between system robustness, extinguishing effect and flexibility for the Midtbykvartalet. Facade sprinklers are considered the most suitable static system solution. Facade sprinklers will primarily cool the facade of the new building and absorb heat radiation from a potential fire in the existing buildings, but will not be suitable for extinguishing or actively fighting a fire within the existing buildings. The design and planning of facade sprinklers shall take the design of windows, balconies and roof terraces into account, which have been identified as vulnerable points in the firewalls.

    Dynamic systems such as water cannons and water mist turbines can be used to cool facades and to actively fight a fire over relatively long distances. In addition, such systems can be established so that the fire service can take over control of the extinguishing system as needed. This property is important, because of the height of the new building and because of how it is surrounded by existing buildings.

    Both water cannons and water mist turbines can be combined with an automatic control that allows you to fight a fire at an early stage, even before the arrival of the fire service, as long as early detection is achieved. A fire that spreads within the existing buildings will not be possible to extinguish with permanently installed dynamic systems. Therefore, the cooling and extinguishing effect of such systems must be evaluated based on the scenario of a large fire in the neighbouring building, which has not been done before.

    The cooling and extinguishing effects for both systems are largely dependent on their control system. The control system must be capable of aiming the water cannon or the water mist turbine at the fire, if required compensating for wind effects and selecting an appropriate water jet mode. Therefore, in order to adapt the control system to the Midtbykvartalet, it is necessary to quantify the cooling and extinguishing effect of such a system in advance and with regard to a potentially large fire in the adjacent existing buildings.

    Selected water mist turbines have the option of operating in a full jet mode, like a water cannon. Therefore, such systems are considered more flexible than water cannons. However, water mist turbines set large amounts of air in motion and generate turbulence that can affect the fire. It is therefore important to investigate if and in which cases this can aggravate the fire and have a negative effect on other areas in the quarter.

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  • 6.
    Skilbred, Ellen Synnøve
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety.
    Holmvaag, Ole Anders
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety.
    Jiang, Lei
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety.
    Fjærestad, Janne Siren
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety.
    Brannsikkerhet i semiautomatiske parkeringsanlegg2023Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Fire safety in semi-automatic parking facilities

    The main goal of this study is to contribute to increased safety in semi-automatic parking facilities. Semi-automatic parking facilities are parking facilities with a system for automatic stacking of cars, but in contrast to fully automatic parking facilities, these are not closed, compact, and unavailable for the public. The study is financed by The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) and Norwegian Building Authority (DiBK). A fire simulation was conducted to compare fire spread in a semi-automatic parking facility to fire spread in an ordinary parking facility. The results indicate that the spread of fire from the car that was first ignited to another car happens approximately equally fast in the two scenarios. Thereafter, the fire spread faster in the semi-automatic parking facility compared to the ordinary parking facility. Although these results should only be considered as indicative, they do show that decreasing the distance between rows of cars can lead to a much faster fire spread. The simulation also shows that the size of a fire in a relatively closed-off parking facility is not necessarily controlled by the number of cars but by the access to air. Hence, the number of openings and properties of ventilation systems in such facilities are important factors to consider when assessing fire safety. A study of regulations and experiences with semi-automatic parking facilities in Norway and other countries as well as aspects that increase risks in semi-automatic parking facilities was conducted. No specific fire-related experiences were discovered, but this is not surprising when considering that fires in parking facilities are relatively rare and there are relatively few semiautomatic parking facilities. In addition, these types of facilities are relatively new. The study found regulations for fully automatic parking facilities in Norway, but semiautomatic parking facilities are not covered by the same regulations. The current regulations do not ensure that the authorities are informed when automatic car-stacking systems are installed in existing parking facilities that are open to the public. There are no regulations ensuring that a fire safety assessment is conducted when an automatic car-stacking system is installed in an existing building regulated for parking that is accessible to the public. It is our opinion that there is a need for a new assessment of fire safety when a system for car stacking is established in an existing parking facility.

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  • 7.
    Stolen, Reidar
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire Technology.
    BRAVENT – Tetting av ventilasjonsfilter med brannrøyk2021Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In the series of BRAVENT projects, the goal is to generate documentation and answers  to issues related to ventilation and fire by investigating these experimentally.  

    In ventilation systems where the smoke will be extracted through the ventilation system in the event of a fire, it is common practice to install so-called bypass solutions to send the smoke past the ventilation filter in the event of a fire. This is done to avoid clogging the filters with smoke particulates and maintain the airflow through the ventilation ducts. If the airflow in the ventilation system stops, smoke can spread freely in the ventilation ducts between different fire cells. For ventilation systems that will be stopped and sealed by fire rated dampers, this challenge is not relevant. 

    Even though this is a common solution, it has been difficult to find documentation that ventilation filters can be clogged by smoke from a fire. As part of BRAVENT, RISE Fire Research has conducted two test series to investigate this problem by drawing fire smoke through a ventilation filter and measuring how quickly the filter clogs. 

    In most experiments that were carried out, it took about an hour before the filter was clogged, but there were also experiments where the filter was clogged within a few minutes. This shows that there can be a big difference in how efficiently fire smoke can clog a ventilation filter, but that under certain conditions this can happen very quickly. For example, an experiment where a small amount of polyether foam was burned in addition to wood showed that the filter was clogged quickly. This shows that the clogging rate is highly dependent on the type of fuel. However, in another test where only wood was burned, the filter was clogged in a similar time frame, indicating that also other factors than the fuel are important. It is thus necessary to secure the smoke an alternative route outside the filter if it is necessary to maintain a certain amount of air in the ventilation system in the event of a fire since the ventilation filter can become clogged within a few minutes.

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  • 8.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE, SP – Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut, SP Fire Research AS, Norge.
    Brannsikkerhet og alternative energibærere: Gasskjøretøy i tunneler og parkeringskjellere2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [no]

    Denne litteraturstudien av brann- og eksplosjonsrisiko for gasskjøretøy i tunneler og parkeringskjellere er en videreføring av et tidligere prosjekt utført ved SP Fire Research, Brannsikkerhet og alternative energibærere: El- og gasskjøretøy i innelukkede rom. I forhold til det tidligere prosjektet, bidrar denne rapporten med referanser til nyere litteratur og fokuserer på kjøretøy med CNG (komprimert naturgass) og hydrogen. Konsekvenser ved en eksplosjon i gasskjøretøy, norsk regelverk og forslag til sannsynlighetsreduserende tiltak diskuteres. Hovedkilden til denne litteraturstudien er en svensk rapport fra 2016.

    Basert på denne studien foreslås det at videre arbeid i første omgang fokuserer på hvilken effekt en hydrogentank- og en hydrogenskyeksplosjon vil ha på typiske, norske parkeringskjellere.

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  • 9.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    En vurdering av effekten til slokkesprayer på det norske markedet2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [no]

    Kravene som stilles til slokkesprayer (en type supplerende brannslokningsutstyr) er tydelige når det gjelder merking, men uklare med hensyn til slokkeeffekt. SP Fire Research har på oppdrag for Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (DSB), testet 11 slokkesprayer for å undersøke hvor god slokkeeffekten er, og hvor godt merket de er. Resultatene fra testene viser at de aller fleste slokkesprayene ikke tilfredsstiller krav til slokkeeffekt som oppstilles av den britiske standarden BS 6165:2002 og den kommende europeiske standarden prEN 16856:2015, som omfatter slike produkter.   De beste produktene viste imidlertid en relativt god slokkeeffekt, og kan være et godt supplement til annet brannslokningsutstyr for å slokke en brann i en tidlig fase. 

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  • 10.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    En vurdering av slokkeeffekten til branntepper på det norske markedet2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [no]

    RISE Fire Research har på oppdrag fra Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap utført tester av branntepper mot brann i frityrgryte. Testene ble gjennomført i henhold til standarden NS-EN 1869, som er beregnet for branntepper. Seks ulike branntepper på det norske markedet ble testet, og hvert produkt ble testet tre ganger.

    Ingen av de seks brannteppene slokket brannen i alle de tre enkeltforsøkene. Brannen ble slokket i kun fire av atten tester.

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  • 11.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety. NTNU, Norway.
    FRIC webinar: Large-scale compartment experiments with exposed Cross-Laminated Timber (CLT).2023Other (Other academic)
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  • 12.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Fullskala branntest av elbil2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [no]

    Norge og Grenland Energy, gjennomført to fullskala branntester av elbiler av merke Tata Indica GLX. Batteriet i bilene var et 26 kWh Li-ion batteri med en katode bestående av nikkel, magnesium og kobolt (NMC-katode).  I test 1 ble en elbil sluppet i fritt fall fra en høyde på 20 meter, for å simulere en kraftig kollisjon. Umiddelbart etter sammenstøtet begynte det å ryke kraftig fra batteriet. Etter  ca. 7 minutter begynte bilen å brenne med synlige flammer. Bilen fikk deretter brenne fritt. Etter 2,5 timer ble temperaturen målt mellom 310 og 540 °C på ulike deler av batteripakken. Bilen var da fullstendig utbrent. Testen viser at en elbil som blir utsatt for en kraftig kollisjon kan begynne å brenne.   I test 2 var målet å antenne batteripakken ved å bruke en ekstern varmekilde, for deretter  å måle hvor mye slokkevann som krevdes for å slokke brannen. Batteriet ble oppvarmet av en propanbrenner fra undersiden av bilen. Etter ca. 10 minutter begynte bilen å brenne med synlige flammer. Det ble gjennomført to slokkeforsøk under brannen. Brannen reantente etter første slokkeforsøk, men ble fullstendig slokket i andre forsøk. Til tross for den eksterne oppvarmingen av batteriet, og at bilen var overtent i en lengre periode, begynte det ikke å brenne i batteripakken. Brannen kunne dermed  slokkes med samme innsatsmetode og tidsforbruk som en brann i en konvensjonell bensin-/dieselbil.

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  • 13.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    et al.
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety. NTNU, Norway.
    Friquin, Kathinka Leikanger
    SINTEF, Norway.
    Brandon, Daniel
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety.
    Steen-Hansen, Anne
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety. NTNU, Norway.
    Ertesvåg, Ivar S.
    NTNU, Norway.
    Fire spread in a large compartment with exposed cross-laminated timber and open ventilation conditions: #FRIC-02 - Exposed wall and ceiling2023In: Fire safety journal, ISSN 0379-7112, E-ISSN 1873-7226, Vol. 141, article id 103986Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Cross-laminated timber (CLT) is becoming increasingly popular due to its many advantages. However, it has been shown that exposed CLT can have a significant effect on fire dynamics and spread rates. Further studies are therefore needed to better understand the impact of CLT to fire safety. Two large-scale CLT compartment fire experiments (95 m2) representing a modern office building have been performed, #FRIC-01 and #FRIC-02. This paper presents the second experiment, #FRIC-02, with exposed CLT on the back wall and the ceiling. The fire developed fast and spread across the room in less than 3.5 min from ignition of the wood crib on the floor and in 1.5 min after the ignition of the ceiling. Large external flames were observed, despite the compartment being well-ventilated. The 5-layer CLT, which comprised a 40 mm thick exposed outer layer and was face-bonded using a common European polyurethane adhesive, exhibited glue-line integrity failure and led to a second flashover after a significant period of decay. Subsequent layers of 20 mm also delaminated before the fire was manually extinguished after 3 h. Compared to #FRIC-01, the fire spread rate was faster, and temperatures, charring rates, heat release rates and external flames were higher. 

  • 14.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    et al.
    NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway.
    Friquin, Kathinka Leikanger
    NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway; SINTEF, Norway.
    Brandon, Daniel
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety.
    Steen-Hansen, Anne
    RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, Safety and Transport, Fire and Safety. NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway.
    Ertesvåg, Ivar
    NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway.
    Fire spread in a large compartment with exposed cross-laminated timber and open ventilation conditions: #FRIC-01 – Exposed ceiling2023In: Fire safety journal, ISSN 0379-7112, E-ISSN 1873-7226, Vol. 140, article id 103869Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Exposing cross-laminated timber (CLT) structures in buildings is increasingly popular in modern buildings. However, large timber surfaces, window facades, and different geometries can change the fire dynamics in a compartment. The effect of those parameters, therefore, needs to be studied. Two large-scale CLT compartment fire experiments (95 m2) have consequently been performed. The experiments were designed to represent a modern office building with an open-plan space and large window openings. In this experiment, #FRIC-01, the ceiling was exposed. The wood crib fire developed slowly and travelled approximately 1.5 m before the ceiling ignited at 32.5 min. Thereafter the fire spread rapidly across the ceiling and wood crib before it shortly after retracted. Three such cycles of rapid spread followed by a retraction occurred within 13 min, whereby the wood crib fire grew larger for each cycle. After the flames extended through the compartment for the fourth time, the fire remained fully developed. After a short period of intense burning, the CLT self-extinguished while the wood crib fire was still burning. The compartment withstood full burnout, and no reignition occurred despite some delamination and using an adhesive that lacks a demonstrated resistance against glue-line integrity failure. © 2023 The Authors

  • 15.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Glansberg, Karin
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Brannrisiko ved lagring av ikke-tilkoblede litium-ion og litiumbatterier2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Fire risk associated with storage of Lithium- and Lithium-ion batteries

    In this project we have been in contact with several different actors that handle and store large quantities of non-connected lithium and lithium-ion batteries. Batteries will, during their lifetime, be stored at different locations, and the locations that are considered to have the largest amount of batteries are manufacturers / distributors and recycling plants.

    For operators who store large quantities of new batteries, it is common to store the batteries on pallets in conventional storage buildings secured by a water sprinkler system. Based on information from the plants we have been in contact with, we consider the fire risk to be about the same as an ordinary warehouse. Factors that may affect the fire risk are: The amount of batteries, battery state of charge, possible ignition sources, general fire protection of the storage, and knowledge of battery-related fire. One possible cause of fire during storage and handling of batteries in a warehouse is due to mechanical damage, for example by a falling pallet from truck. Mechanical damage can cause internal short-circuits in the battery cells, which will generate heat, and possibly a fire. Handling by truck is in itself a possible source of ignition as there are examples that a truck has started to burn both during charging and while driving.

    At a battery packaging facility we have been in contact with, who receives battery cells directly from a manufacturer, the cells had a charge state of 20 % and were packed according to the transport standard UN 3480. The focus on fire safety and the knowledge of batteries in general was high.

    For actors distributing batteries as part of a larger product assortment, the amount of batteries will be substantially smaller, and knowledge of battery-related fire will normally be less. The charging state of batteries in such warehouses is stated to be higher than that of the manufacturer and may be about 50 – 95 %. A high state of charge makes the cells more unstable and based on this we believe that the risk is somewhat higher for such storage, than storage of battery cells with lower charge levels.

    At recycling facilities, there is a significantly higher fire risk than storage of new batteries in storage, mainly because cells have been (and are) subject to mechanical stresses in the form of vibrations and shocks, which can lead to more unstable cells and possibly lead to internal short circuits. External short circuits can also occur if the terminals of a battery come into contact through a low-resistance connection. The recycling plants we have been in contact with, have a high focus on fire safety and have taken a number of precautions to prevent a fire to occur, and have put in place measures that can prevent a small fire to develop into a larger fire. The recycling plants seem to have good control over the fire risk of batteries that are checked and sorted, while the fire risk is somewhat higher in the area where the batteries can be unsorted and not currently controlled. Several of the recycling plants experience regular fire outbreaks caused by lithium / lithium-ion batteries, but these cases are normally handled with simple fire extinguishing measures on site.

    Based on those we have been in contact with, we believe that the actors with the greatest amount of batteries also have a high focus on fire safety and a great deal of knowledge about battery safety, which together pose an acceptable risk.

    The fire risk for actors handling and storing smaller amounts of batteries may be higher, as there is less focus on and knowledge of battery safety.

    As the result of this project mainly is based on visiting different actors, there may be other actors with a slightly different focus on fire safety and knowledge about batteries.

    The following learning points have been extracted:

    General• Have good procedures to reduce fire risk.• Ensure that practices comply with procedures.

    Storage of batteries in stock• Keep the cells in as low charge state as possible. When packaging according to UN 3480, this is automatically fulfilled.• Have good dialogue with the local fire department.• Have good truck driving routines to avoid dropping pallets.• Place possible sources of ignition (e.g. truck charger) at a sufficient distance from combustible materials.

    Batteries at recycling plants• Limit the amount of batteries in one place.• Store different battery types separated in appropriate storage containers, in a dry location.• Ensure that degassing from batteries may not lead to accumulation of combustible gases.• Keep combustible materials at a safe distance.• Provide a safe zone where unstable batteries can temporarily be stored.• Ensure good training of employees.• Have general order and orderliness.• Access to local fire extinguishing equipment.• Have good dialogue with the local fire department.• Provide good access for the fire service.

    Further work is needed to document the fire characteristics of a pallet of non-connected battery cells, in the form of full-scale fire tests to document flammability, fire spread and fire dynamics, and how such a fire can be extinguished.

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  • 16.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    et al.
    NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway.
    Nele Mäger, Katrin
    Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia.
    Leikanger Friquin, Kathinka
    SINTEF Community, Norway.
    Just, Alar
    Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia.
    FRIC Webinar : Charring of wooden I-joists in assemblies with combustible insulation2021Other (Other academic)
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  • 17.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Reitan, Nina Kristine
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Brannsikkerhet og alternative energibærere: Hydrogenkjøretøy i parkeringskjellere2018Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [no]

    I denne litteraturstudien har vi undersøkt hvordan norske parkeringskjellere er bygget, og hvilke sikringstiltak som finnes mot brann og eksplosjon. Vi har videre sett på mulige konsekvenser for bygg og mennesker ved hydrogengasseksplosjon, der hydrogen fra en lekkasje akkumuleres og antennes, og ved hydrogentankeksplosjon, der hydrogentanken revner som følge av varmepåkjenning.

    Hittil er det få gassbiler på norske veier, og det har i liten grad vært vurdert å sikre parkerings-kjellere mot gasslekkasjer og en eventuell eksplosjon. Vanlige sikringstiltak for å redusere risikoen ved en eksplosjon, som store avlastningsflater, deteksjon koblet opp mot ventilasjonsanlegg med tilstrekkelig kapasitet, og eksplosjonssikkert, elektrisk utstyr er derfor lite utbredt i eksisterende parkeringskjellere.

    Små lekkasjerater fra et hydrogensystem (slanger, koblinger) i store romvolum med eksos-ventilasjon er ikke forventet å resultere i store overtrykk. For større utslipp av hydrogen, der hele tankens innhold slipper ut på kort tid, er det imidlertid fare for omfattende skader. Forsøk som er beskrevet i litteraturen viser at avhengig av parametere, kan 5 kg hydrogen føre til overtrykk i størrelsesorden 10 – 100 kPa. Forsøkene er imidlertid utført i innelukkede rom med et romvolum mindre enn i en parkeringskjeller, og resultatene må derfor benyttes med en viss varsomhet. En hydrogentank som revner ved eksponering av brann vil føre til en kraftig flammeball, og store eksplosjonsskader lokalt.

    Å beregne sannsynlighet for at ulike scenarier skal inntreffe har ikke vært en del av dette prosjektet. Siden flere mindre sannsynlige hendelser må inntreffe samtidig, er sannsynligheten liten for at store lekkasjer fra tanken skal skje når bilen er parkert i en parkeringskjeller, eller at tanken eksploderer ved eksponering for en brann.

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  • 18.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Sesseng, Christian
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Krav til ettersyn og pålitelighet til sprinkleranlegg2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [no]

    RISE Fire Research har på oppdrag fra Firemesh kartlagt og sammenfattet regelverk og krav knyttet til ettersyn av automatiske slokkeanlegg, samt innhentet opplysninger om pålitelighet til sprinkleranlegg.

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  • 19.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Sesseng, Christian
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Hox, Kristian
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    BRAVENT – Delrapport 2 ; Brannspredning i ventilasjonskanaler2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This is sub-report 2 of the BRAVENT project (Fire and smoke distribution in ventilation ducts) which presents results from experiments where the risk of spreading fire and heat in ventilation ducts has been investigated. In the experiments, the effect of fire insulation on the duct, and mixing hot smoke with air at room temperature in the duct (as from adjacent rooms) has been investigated. The ventilation duct was connected to a furnace at one end and a fan at the other end. The furnace was heated to the desired temperature, and hot smoke was drawn through the duct at a certain velocity. Thermocouples measured the temperature both inside the duct (smoke gas temperatures) and on the duct’s external surface at different distances from the furnace.

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  • 20.
    Sæter Bøe, Andreas
    et al.
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Sesseng, Christian
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    Stensaas, Jan Paul
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden (2017-2019), Safety and Transport, Fire Research Norway.
    BRAVENT – Delrapport 1 : Teori- og kunnskapssammenstilling2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently questions about whether spread of heat and smoke in ventilation ducts during a fire represent an increased risk for personal safety and loss of properties have been raised. The technical solutions currently used to fulfill the pre-accepted performance given in the guidelines to the building regulations with regard to fire protection of ventilation ducts are largely based on descriptions in SINTEF's Building Design Sheet 520.352 on fire- and smoke protection of ventilation systems, and in BV Netts Guide for fireproof ventilation, also known as the BVNett Guide. This topic was once again raised in connection with the revision of the 2017 edition of the building regulations, when it was pointed out in inquiry statements that the pre-accepted performances are insufficiently defined and that the solutions outlined in the Building Design Sheet and the BVNett Guide are not sufficiently documented.

    In order to elucidate this topic and provide scientific documentation on the extent to which the spread of heat and smoke in ventilation ducts represents a risk to persons and properties, the BRAVENT project (Fire and smoke spread in ventilation ducts) was initiated.

    The project investigates issues related to heat dissipation in ventilation ducts, clogging of filters in ventilation systems due to smoke, the effect of the seal-up strategy with respect to pressure build-up in the fire room and smoke spread through leakages in the construction.

    The objective of the sub-task presented in this report was to:

    Compile a theoretical basis for the experiments and analyzes to be carried out.

    1. Map relevant regulations for fire protection of ventilation systems.

    2. Map standards that are the basis for determining the fire resistance of components included in a ventilation system.

    3. Map the state-of-the-art regarding a. the need to fire insulate ventilation ducts.

    b. the need to install bypass channels to prevent the filter systems from being clogged by smoke particles.

    c. the effect of installing fire dampers in all fire-partitions with respect to smoke spread.

    d. how smoke can be spread via ventilation ducts and leaks in the building structure.

    e. the pros and cons of seal-up and extraction strategies.

    © RISE Research Institutes of Sweden

    This is sub-report 1, which summarizes the relevant, fire-related theory and state-of-the-art in the focus area. The report serves as the theoretical basis for planning of experiments and for the other activities in the BRAVENT project.

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