Denne rapporten presenterer resultater fra et prosjekt som er utført av Fire Research and Innovation Centre - FRIC fra 2020 til 2022. Første versjon av rapporten ble publisert på engelsk i mars 2022. Denne norske versjonen er oversatt av SINTEF Digital og RISE Fire Research i samarbeid. En spesiell takk til Caroline Kristensen for arbeidet med oversettelsen. Rapporten er også oppdatert på enkelte punkter, uten at fokus og konklusjoner skal være endret.

Learning from incidents is widely accepted as a core part of safety management. This is also true for fires – however few fires in Norway are investigated. Fires are interesting incidents conceptually due to their potential of devastating outcomes on material and human lives and because they happen across all sectors and industries, businesses, and homes. In Norway, several different actors play a role in investigating and learning from fires, from the fire rescue services to directorates and Non-Governmental Organisations. The present study seeks to understand the preconditions for learning from fires in Norway, with emphasis on the formal actors that play a role in preventing and mitigating fires. Methodologically, the study is based on qualitative interviews conducted with relevant actors from first responders, authorities, and other sectors. We found that there are structural, cultural, technological, and relational aspects that seem to influence learning from fires in Norway. The results were analyzed using thematic analysis and the Pentagon model framework. The findings are discussed in relation to theories from organisational learning and learning from incidents.

Experiences regarding personal protection water mist systems installed in dwellings. Personal protection water mist systems can produce a water mist that can cool down and limit a fire in a small area in a dwelling. The system is equipped with sensitive detectors which can activate the system in the early stages of the fire and limit the fire spread, and in some cases extinguish the fire. This gives more time for evacuation, which can be especially important for vulnerable people with risk factors, like impaired cognitive and physical functioning. The goal of this study has been to map the experiences in Norway regarding personal protection water mist systems, considering how the municipalities have experienced the work related to the systems and whether the systems have activated and saved lives. This will shed light upon whether mobile water mist systems are appropriate measures for vulnerable people in the society, and the risk factors that determine whether the measure is appropriate or not. This study has used literature studies, questionnaires, and interviews to map the experiences of personal protection water mist systems in Norway. The results showed that personal protection water mist systems installed in Norwegian dwellings have been activated in connection with fire outbreaks, and thus limited or extinguished the fire. This has saved lives on several occasions and reduced the damage potential. There are many people who have risk factors that make it appropriate to install a mobile water mist system in their home, but there are also exceptions. The risk factors that indicate that it is beneficial to install mobile water mist systems in Norwegian dwellings are - Impaired cognitive abilities - Impaired physical abilities - Drug and alcohol problems - Smoking - Living alone The systems are particularly suitable when several of the risk factors are present at the same time. It was also shown that personal protection water mist systems are not suitable for mobile people who spend time in several places in the home and are therefore often outside the system's coverage area. Personal protection water mist systems are not recommended for people who may have the potential to sabotage the system. In questionnaires and interviews, it emerged that there are big differences between how Norwegian municipalities work with assigning, installing, operating, and maintaining personal protection water mist systems. In larger municipalities, there are more people who rely on routines and formal processes for the work, and there is therefore a greater proportion of the larger municipalities who distribute the facilities out to individuals than in the small municipalities where the work is more characterised by informal routines and personal relations. 3 Based on the results from this study, it is our opinion that the following aspects should be covered by future work: • Need for a new and updated cost-benefit analysis for personal protection water mist systems. • Need for a better statistical basis for assessment of the personal protection water mist systems. • Need for a Norwegian test standard for personal protection water mist systems. • Need for clear guidelines for assignment, procurement, installing, operation, and maintenance of personal protection water mist systems.

The late 90s and the early 2000s was a period with relative extensive research and innovation in the area of manual fire extinguishing methods and equipment for the fire service. New equipment such as the cutting extinguisher and extinguishing spears allowed to conduct offensive attacks from the exterior of a building, reducing the exposure of fire fighters to fire and smoke and their associated risks in general. This led to the development of new firefighting tactics, as for example the Quadrant Model of the Dutch fire service, which extends the “traditional” offensive interior attack and defensive exterior attack by the offensive exterior attack and defensive interior attack.Recently the research focus has furthermore increasingly shifted to environmental aspects, such as the water consumption and effect of additives (i.e., foam) on humans and the environment. Extinguishing with smaller amounts of water is beneficial for the environment, reduces water damage and lowers the burden on the water delivery system.ConclusionIn conclusion, the systems most relevant to be further tested in a fire situation in a small house or dwelling are the cutting extinguisher and the extinguishing spear.These systems are different in operation but have both shown to be promising with regard to fulfilling the different objectives of the overall project. Being relatively easy to utilize with the right training during internal extinguishing efforts executed from the outside of the building, and being only water based to minimize contamination, due to lower water consumption, of the surrounding areas give these systems advantages over conventional equipment.Especially if the systems are used in combination with an IR camera to locate the fire, the extinguishing efforts can be started early and effectively, and the water amount needed to control the fire may be reduced. The need for firefighters with breathing apparatus is reduced as well, hence reducing the smoke exposure to firefighters.The fact that the fire service also recognizes the potential of using these systems early in the extinguishing efforts, and is working on implementing them, prompts the need for scientific backup.

The RISE report 2019:04 «Charcoal and wood burning ovens in restaurants – Fire safety and documentation requirements» [1] investigated regulations and documental demands tied to charcoal and wood burning ovens in restaurants in Norway. A part of the conclusion in this report emphasized the need for, through physical testing, mapping whether existing test standards covers the safety requirements of charcoal ovens in restaurants. NS-EN 13240:2001 «Roomheaters fired with solid fuel. Requirements and test methods» [2] was chosen as a relevant test standard. Three test ovens (a closed test oven, a dummy oven and an open test oven) was produced at RISE Fire Research. Their construction with regard to insulation capabilities, materials and dimensions was based on existing charcoal ovens placed on the Norwegian marked. This was done to achieve an objective depiction of the issue, without the need for a specific brand of ovens. Restaurant oven charcoal was utilized to achieve as real heat development as possible in the test ovens. The test layout is based on NS-EN 12340:2001, with a test rigg constructed of two «safety walls», ceiling and floor attached with thermocouples. Temperatures from the test oven are registered in the safety walls at several positions according to a standardised grid, and in the ceiling and the floor each have one single measurement position measuring warmest point. Thermocouples in the chimney and exhaust duct measured the flue gas temperatures transported to the exhaust system. Four different tests were conducted, where the first one was a standardized safety test including the closed oven model. The second test was the same safety test setup with the dummy oven besides the closed oven. The dummy contained a built-in propane burner to simulate the heat load from a real oven. The purpose was to simulate two ovens placed next to each other. The third test was an overload test on the closed test oven with 150 % fuel load and higher refuelling frequency. The last test was a test of the open test oven. The safety test method described in NS-EN 13240:2001 is suitable to test the level of stable maximal temperature in the surrounding combustible materials, in the same way as for roomheaters, which the method is designed for. The method addresses safety aspects such as surface temperatures and handles on the oven. Tests show that the temperatures developed in the ovens have the potential to breech the temperature criterion given by the test standard, and therefore contribute to the ignition of surrounding combustible materials. Such situations pose a fire risk and safety measures regarding this aspect must be documented by the producer. NS-EN13240:2001 does not cover temperatures for exhaust duct and the production of sparks and their possible spread to combustible materials. These are important safety aspects which must be addressed when documenting the fire safety of restaurant grills. Tests show that sparks are created in the oven, including from restaurant charcoal fuel, and are transported into the exhaust duct, and out through the opening of the grill door. Together with high flue gas temperatures in the exhaust duct and deposits of soot and cooking oil this pose a fire risk. Documentation must therefore be presented, showing that the oven is equipped with measures (for instance spark screen) which guards the exhaust duct from sparks to a satisfactory degree. Operators of the oven must receive adequate training and must operate the closed oven with caution, as to avoid incidents with sparks being released though the door. The placement of ovens next to each other does not seem to increase the heat load on surrounding walls but may lead to increased temperatures in between the ovens. The consequences of temperature increases must be documented. Tests show that overloading with fuel and intensifying the refuelling intervals can lead to increased temperatures in the oven, which can affect materials and welding seams. Overloading can also affect the temperatures towards surrounding walls and exhaust ducts and therefore may affect fire safety negatively. NS-EN 13240:2001 requires the producer to documents how the oven is constructed and of what materials, and that the welding seams are dimensioned for the materials used. It is recommended that the producer documents the safety level of the oven materials with an overload test. It must also be documented that the exhaust ducts in which the flue gas are transported are constructed to handle the potential temperatures that can arise, including erroneous use.

This article presents an analysis of a fire in a municipal apartment building used as housing for people with challenges connected to drug addiction. The fire took place in Norway 7th of August 2021. The incident happened during the night and the fire was spreading quickly and intensely via the external wooden balconies. The combination of risk factors both connected to the fire development and the characteristics of the occupants raises the potential for fire fatalities. This analysis seeks to understand why the fire spread with such a speed, and how everyone in the building survived without injuries. The analysis identified both technical and human factors that may help to answer these questions. The findings suggest that there were deficiencies connected to the technical fire safety design that if improved could have reduced the fire damage. Factors promoting the fire spread and fire intensity include the choice of wood material used in the construction of the balconies, no sprinkler system installed on the balconies and a large fire load on the balconies caused by the occupants’ tendency to accumulate possessions on the balconies. Factors contributing to the outcome of no injuries or fatalities included occupants being awake during these late hours, and the strong social network between them. Such a network should be seen as a positive factor regarding robustness against fire and should be encouraged.

Fires are devastating events that may harm humans, properties and the environment. Authorities, organisations, companies and societies should be able to learn from fire incidents to reduce the probability and impact of future fires. To achieve a reduction in fires and their consequences, an effort is needed from multiple actors and both technical, organisational and individual changes would be necessary. Importantly, we therefore consider change as a prerequisite for learning. So how can we as a society change or modify our efforts for prevention and mitigation of fires? A learning approach often starts with some form of inquiry about the occurred accidents – an investigation. This investigation can take many forms: the fire services’ own evaluations of the response to a fire, an authority’s assessments of the compliance and fit of their regulations, a company’s analysis of internal rules and organisation, and the police’s investigation of criminal issues. Investigations require highly skilled professionals using often multidisciplinary skills such as knowledge in human behaviour, fire dynamics, electrical systems, mechanical processes and many more. A fire investigator may use many different techniques and tactics, to figure out how the fire started, what fault led to the fire, what made the fire develop the way it did and, also what factors and measures that worked well in the fire. The investigator can work for the fire service, the police, insurance companies, hired private fire investigators or in larger companies, to mention a few. However, not all fires are investigated in Norway, and there is also a large number of incidents that is concluded with an unknown fire cause. The aim of our research has been to increase the society’s capacity to learn from fires. We have two main objectives contributing to the aim: 1. Obtain knowledge on the preconditions for learning from fires in Norway. 2. Provide recommendations to increase learning from fires in Norway. Leading to these main objectives, we shed light on investigations, examinations, databases and routines related to the different actors, and importantly, the actors’ beliefs, collaboration and practices related to fire prevention and learning. The main corpus of material in this study is interviews with actors relevant for learning from fires in Norway. The informants were from the fire service, the police, educational system, insurance, authorities and organisations with interest in fire safety. The interviews were related to themes like cooperation inside and outside the organisation, resources and databases, how the interviewees see the fire investigation area today and how it should be improved. The findings were then divided into the Pentagon model’s five categories: • formal structure • technology and infrastructure • culture • interaction • relations and network The findings from the interviews and the reasons behind them are extensive and are elaborated upon in the report, but the main points are summarised here. Generally, we see clearly that learning from fires is a complex issue. It does not only encompass obtaining the correct technical insights from a fire scene, but also informal aspects like the personal relations and how the fire services are organised. Further, we see that fire investigation in Norway lack both the quality and quantity needed to obtain sufficient knowledge on fires that occur. The approaches, mandates and focus vary greatly with each actor, and this affects the coordination, cooperation, and systematic work of learning from investigations. High variation can also be found in the fire services’ own evaluations of their own fire-fighting efforts, which leads to regionally different methodology and terminology. This has an additional negative impact on the cooperative work even between fire departments. The cooperation is also varying when it comes to the sharing of knowledge which is prevalent between all actors involved in fire investigation. Little cooperation is formalised and therefore most cooperation on investigation and learning, as well as the sharing of knowledge and experiences, are done through individual and personal relations. This is also true inside the fire services where personal experiences and social learning is preferred to more systematic evaluation of fires and formal education. This creates a potential conflict with efforts of standardising work and learning processes. Lastly the lack of resources in preventive work in fire and rescue services and the police, especially in the investigation phase, hinders the possibility to learn effectively from fires and to convey the experiences from them. The difference in status between preventive and preparedness efforts in these public services is still relevant today.

This study evaluates efficient, low-exposure and environmentally friendly extinguishing of fires in small building units and is commissioned by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) and the Norwegian Building Authority (DiBK). The main objective is to increase the knowledge on how to extinguish fires in smaller building units efficiently in terms of time and water amount, with minimal exposure of the fire service to smoke, heat and direct contact with soot, as well as minimal environmental exposure in case of extinguishing water run-off. For a holistic evaluation of firefighting methods, the tactical assessments and priorities of the fire service were also studied. In total seven medium-scale fire tests were carried out in a 13.5 m2 compartment with a ceiling height of 2.4 m, a ventilation opening of 0.54 m2 and an adjacent corridor. The fuel in the experiments consisted mainly of a sofa with mattresses according to specifications given in the "open space" test specified in the standard IMO Resolution 265 (84) and walls clad with OSB boards. One experiment was carried out with real furniture. The study focuses on indirect extinguishing (i.e., cooling of the fire gases) with four different extinguishing methods, which are: • Coldcut cobra cutting extinguisher and water, • Spray nozzle and water, • Spray nozzle and foam, • Fognail extinguishing spear and water. The extinguishing was started based on a temperature criterion of 350°C, 80 cm below the ceiling. The water consumption during extinguishing, the fire compartment temperature, as well as the particle and the gas concentration (CO, CO2, etc.), were measured during the experiments. Measuring devices for temperature, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in particulate phase and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were attached to a firefighter’s jacket to measure exposure. The firefighters stayed, during all experiments, for at least 1.5 minutes in the fire compartment to ensure a measurable PAH and VOC exposure. The experiments were furthermore documented with video recordings from several angles and infrared video of the fire compartment. After four of the trials, interviews with the fire service were conducted to evaluate the tactical assessments made during the firefighting effort. In the experiments, all extinguishing methods caused the temperature in the smoke layer to drop below 150°C within 2.5 minutes and the flaming fire was extinguished. The fire re-ignited in all experiments approx. 6 minutes after the start of the experiment, except for experiment F4, extinguishing with foam, where there was re-ignition after approx. 4 minutes. The experiments showed that the cutting extinguisher and Fognail have a good effect, even under "artificial" limitations in the experiments (duration and direction of the extinguishment). Both of these extinguishing methods used approximately the same amount of water. As the purchase costs for a Fognail are significantly less than for a cutting extinguisher, the Fognail has been found to be not only an efficient extinguishing method but also beneficial from a cost/benefit perspective. Purchasing costs are important for the fire service, especially for smaller fire services. Foam had the poorest cooling effect in the experiments and led to the fastest re-ignition. It was therefore concluded that foam is at high temperatures the least suited extinguishing method to reduce the temperature in the fire compartment. However, it is important that the use of foam is considered depending on the given fire scenario since the present study did not evaluate all properties and possible benefits of foam (such as the ability to cover flammable liquid). Furthermore, it can be assumed that foam can have a better effect when the temperature in the fire compartment is first lowered by using an external extinguishing method. The combination of foam and external extinguishing methods was not investigated in the present study. It is therefore recommended to evaluate this combination in future studies. To use an external extinguishing method (cutting extinguisher or Fognail) as an immediate measure in advance of internal firefighting gives the following advantages compared with smoke diving without the use of an external extinguishing method: • less soot and less explosive/toxic fire gases in the fire compartment, • better effect of the secondary internal extinguishing agent, • faster reduction of the temperature in the fire compartment, • less sauna effect (high humidity can cause heat to penetrate the clothes of the firefighters, which in turn can lead to injuries and that the smoke divers must retreat). The measurements during the experiments show that the use of cutting extinguishers or extinguishing spears can reduce exposure to the fire brigade with regard to heat and contact with particles. It was not possible to identify a clear trend for exposure to the carcinogens (PAH and VOC) measured at the firefighter’s jacket, by comparing the different extinguishing methods in the experiments. The experiments and interviews with the fire service further showed that the firefighter underestimated the negative ejector effect that ventilation openings into the fire compartment have. That is, placing a nozzle near an opening can lead to more oxygen being supplied to the fire which aggravates the situation. The video recordings from the experiments are published together with this report and will be a good learning tool for the fire service.

Introduction: Firefighters are exposed to significant levels of heat stress during duty, and therefore fire-fighting exercises in hot environments must be regularly performed [1]. This study aimed to investigate the effect of extreme heat exposure on physiological responses during and after one simulated smoke dive.

Methods: Nineteen professional male firefighters (43 ± 8 years, 84 ± 7 kg) wearing protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus with a total weight of 108 ± 7 kg participated. They performed a 15-min simulated smoke dive in a two-floor heat chamber (HEAT) at ambient temperatures ranging from 110 °C to 272 °C, followed by 5-min up and down stair walking outside the heat chamber. Heart rate (HR), gastrointestinal temperature (Tgi) and skin temperatures (Tsk) were registered continuously during the test.

Results: Tgi increased significantly from start (37.5 ± 0.3 °C) to the peak of HEAT (38.4 ± 0.4 °C) and continued to increase after the heat exposure and stair walking (39.6 ± 0.5 °C). The HR also increased significantly from start (92 ± 14 bpm) to the peak of HEAT (185 ± 13 bpm) and further increased after the heat exposure and stair walking to a maximum of 190 ± 13 bpm.

Conclusion: A 20-min firefighter smoke dive in hot environments induced high physiological strain on the firefighters, and Tgi and HR continued to increase after the heat exposure. This must be considered during live fire events when repeated smoke dives are required.

Modern buildings are being built with increasingly complex technical installations and energy systems. The introduction of renewable energy production, like photovoltaic (PV) panels on building roofs and facades and an increasing number of connected electric appliances, changes the way the electric power is distributed from production to end-user. The difference in production and demand for energy over time also gives incentives for installing energy storage systems. Electric energy can be stored in batteries, transferred into hydrogen gas via electrolysis or stored as thermal energy for use later. The current work presents an overview of an ongoing study in the Fire Research and Innovation Centre (FRIC), on fire safety implications related to implementing new technology for energy storage and production. The focus is on the built environment such as dwellings and office buildings situated in the Nordic countries. This study builds on previous studies of related topics

Utkastet til standard «prNS 3807:2019 Bruk av heis til evakuering» er utarbeidet med hensikt åetablere bestemmelser som kan benyttes for å bruke heis til evakuering av bygninger og anlegg,selv om byggteknisk forskrift (TEK17) angir at «Heis og rulletrapp kan ikke være del av fluktveieller rømningsvei. Slike innretninger skal stoppe på en sikker måte ved brannalarm». Det vises tilkrav til at økt tilgjengelighet, inkludert for personer med nedsatte funksjonsevner, medfører øktekrav til evakuering. Såkalte «sikre heissoner» skal bidra til at heiser skal kunne være i drift lengretid enn det som er tillatt i dag.

RISE Fire Research har fått i oppdrag fra Direktoratet for byggkvalitet (DiBK) og Direktoratetfor samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (DSB) å undersøke forutsetninger ved sikkerhetsbarrierer oghensyn til menneskelig adferd i prNS 3807:2019.

Med utgangspunkt i oppdragsgivers spørsmål er noen usikkerhetsmomenter identifisert medhensyn til trygg bruk av heis ved brann i prNS 3807:2019. Noen er knyttet til vurdering av kriterierfor røykproduksjon og aktivisering av heisstopp. Brannskille i ventesone som oppfyller kriterieneangitt i prNS 3807:2019 vil ikke nødvendigvis forhindre røykspredning. Det er også usikkert hvorgodt de logiske heissonene, som er åpne og altså ikke er omgitt av noen skiller, ivaretarsikkerheten for personer som venter på en heis.

Det angis ingen krav til minimumsstørrelse på fysisk heissone eller krav til plass forrullestolbrukere, noe som kan lede til at rømningsveier blir sperret og til opphopning av folk.

Det er spesiell usikkerhet er knyttet til informasjon og kommunikasjon om evakueringen.Manglende krav til informativ talemelding kan bidra til at personer ikke forstår hva lyssignal ogtekst betyr, og dermed setter seg selv i fare. Det fremstår slik at sikkerheten i stor grad er avhengigav organisatoriske tiltak, noe som det i varierende grad kan legges til rette for avhengig av hvabygningen skal brukes til. Det kan være utfordrende å sikre at organisatoriske planer følges i langtid etter at de ble vedtatt i et brannkonsept, for eksempel siden aktiviteten og bruken av bygningenkan forandre seg over tid.

Det stilles ikke krav om nærliggende alternative rømningsveier/trapp i anslutning til heis, dersomgitte barrierer blir brutt slik at ventesonen blir røykfylt og heisen stopper.

Standarden legger kun opp til brukerstyring ved evakuering, dvs. det er brukerne selv somprioriterer hvem som kan ta heisen. Derfor ivaretas ikke nødvendigvis de som har størst behovfor rømning med heis.

Sosiale bånd kan både forsinke og effektivisere en evakuering, avhengig av forholdene iforbindelse med alarmen (type bygning, aktivitet i bygningen, karakteristiske forhold vedbrannen, etc.) og menneskene som evakuerer (er de i slekt, kjenner de hverandre, andre faktorersom påvirker hvordan individer samhandler ved en hendelse).

Med hensyn til å endre på innlært adferd (at man ikke skal ta heisen når alarmen går), vil detsannsynligvis kreves mye informasjonsarbeid for å få folk til å faktisk bruke heisen, og de vil nokvære mer villige å benytte seg av den jo høyere etasje de oppholder seg på. Når folk først har lærtseg at heis er trygt, er det uvisst om det er en reell risiko for at folk vil ta heisen også ved brann ibygg som ikke har «trygge soner».

Kunnskap om hvordan man skal oppføre seg i en spesifikk bygning ved en brannsituasjon ernødvendig, men det er sannsynligvis ikke gjennomførbart med opplæring på forhånd for allegrupper av brukere i alle typer bygninger. I mange tilfeller vil det være snakk om sporadiskopphold, slik at informasjon i forbindelse med en konkret hendelse vil være mer relevant. Da erbudskapet viktig, og at det fremføres på en måte som alle kan tilegne seg. Det er derfor vanskeligå generalisere eller standardisere behov for opplæring og behov for organisering for alle typerbygg.