Attestation Mechanisms for Trusted Execution Environments DemystifiedShow others and affiliations
2022 (English)In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH , 2022, Vol. 13272, p. 95-113Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]
Attestation is a fundamental building block to establish trust over software systems. When used in conjunction with trusted execution environments, it guarantees the genuineness of the code executed against powerful attackers and threats, paving the way for adoption in several sensitive application domains. This paper reviews remote attestation principles and explains how the modern and industrially well-established trusted execution environments Intel SGX, Arm TrustZone and AMD SEV, as well as emerging RISC-V solutions, leverage these mechanisms.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH , 2022. Vol. 13272, p. 95-113
Keywords [en]
AMD SEV, Arm TrustZone, Attestation, Intel SGX, RISC-V, Trusted execution environments, Applications domains, Fundamental building blocks, Sensitive application, Software-systems, ARM processors
National Category
Computer Systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-60269DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-16092-9_7Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85137982905ISBN: 9783031160912 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:ri-60269DiVA, id: diva2:1702336
Conference
22nd IFIP WG 6.1 International Conference on Distributed Applications and Interoperable Systems, DAIS 2022 Held as part of the 17th International Federated Conference on Distributed Computing Techniques, DisCoTec 2022. Lucca13 June 2022 through 17 June 2022
Note
Funding details: Horizon 2020 Framework Programme, H2020, 957197; Funding details: Stiftelsen för Strategisk Forskning, SSF; Funding details: Schweizerische Studienstiftung, SSF; Funding text 1: project, which received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 957197, and from the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (SSF) aSSIsT.
2022-10-102022-10-102023-06-08Bibliographically approved