We present the experimental evaluation of different security mechanisms applied to persistent state in intermittent computing. Whenever executions become intermittent because of energy scarcity, systems employ persistent state on non-volatile memories (NVMs) to ensure forward progress of applications. Persistent state spans operating system and network stack, as well as applications. While a device is off recharging energy buffers, persistent state on NVMs may be subject to security threats such as stealing sensitive information or tampering with configuration data, which may ultimately corrupt the device state and render the system unusable. Based on modern platforms of the Cortex M*series, we experimentally investigate the impact on typical intermittent computing workloads of different means to protect persistent state, including software and hardware implementations of staple encryption algorithms and the use of ARM TrustZone protection mechanisms. Our results indicate that i) software implementations bear a significant overhead in energy and time, sometimes harming forward progress, but also retaining the advantage of modularity and easier updates; ii) hardware implementations offer much lower overhead compared to their software counterparts, but require a deeper understanding of their internals to gauge their applicability in given application scenarios; and iii) TrustZone shows almost negligible overhead, yet it requires a different memory management and is only effective as long as attackers cannot directly access the NVMs