Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
On the effects of distance-decreasing attacks on cryptographically protected GNSS signals
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, ICT, SICS. KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
2019 (English)In: ION 2019 International Technical Meeting Proceedings, Institute of Navigation , 2019, p. 363-372Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The security of global navigation satellite systems draws attention increasingly, and authentication mechanisms for civilian services seem very effective in thwarting malicious behavior. For example, the Galileo E1 Open Service introduces navigation message authentication. Authentication, as well as encryption at navigation message or spreading code level, can prevent spoofing attacks, but do not preclude replay attacks. In this work, we consider a type of strong replay attacks, distance-decreasing attacks, against cryptographically protected GNSS signals. Distance-decreasing attack enhance an attacker's capability of allowing it to mislead the victim receiver that the GNSS signals arrive earlier than true signals. We analyze the instantiation and the effects of the distance-decreasing attacks on unprotected GNSS signals, on navigation message authenticated signals, and on spreading-code encrypted signals. We discuss different strategies that the attacker can adopt to introduce the least bit errors to the re-transmitted signals and avoid being detected at the victim receiver. We provide evaluation results of distance-decreasing attacks on unprotected signals and authenticated navigation message signals, based on different strategies and configurations, and we sketch countermeasures to the different strategies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Navigation , 2019. p. 363-372
Keywords [en]
Distance-decreasing (DD) attacks, Early detection (ED), Late commit (LC), Navigation message authentication (NMA), Spreading code encryption (SCE), Authentication, Codes (symbols), Cryptography, Navigation, Navigation messages, Spreading codes, Global positioning system
National Category
Natural Sciences
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-39683DOI: 10.33012/2019.16736Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85068322902ISBN: 0936406216 (print)ISBN: 9780936406213 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:ri-39683DiVA, id: diva2:1341103
Conference
Institute of Navigation International Technical Meeting 2019, ITM 2019, 28 January 2019 through 31 January 2019
Note

Funding details: Stiftelsen för Strategisk Forskning, SSF; Funding text 1: This work has been partially supported by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (SSF) SURPRISE project.

Available from: 2019-08-07 Created: 2019-08-07 Last updated: 2019-08-07Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus
By organisation
SICS
Natural Sciences

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
isbn
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
isbn
urn-nbn
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
v. 2.35.7