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Sæter Bøe, AndreasORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0003-2396-1325
Alternative names
Publications (10 of 20) Show all publications
Skilbred, E. S., Sæter Bøe, A., Holmvaag, O. A., Jiang, L. & Fjærestad, J. S. (2023). Brannsikkerhet i semiautomatiske parkeringsanlegg.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Brannsikkerhet i semiautomatiske parkeringsanlegg
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2023 (Norwegian)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Fire safety in semi-automatic parking facilities

The main goal of this study is to contribute to increased safety in semi-automatic parking facilities. Semi-automatic parking facilities are parking facilities with a system for automatic stacking of cars, but in contrast to fully automatic parking facilities, these are not closed, compact, and unavailable for the public. The study is financed by The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) and Norwegian Building Authority (DiBK). A fire simulation was conducted to compare fire spread in a semi-automatic parking facility to fire spread in an ordinary parking facility. The results indicate that the spread of fire from the car that was first ignited to another car happens approximately equally fast in the two scenarios. Thereafter, the fire spread faster in the semi-automatic parking facility compared to the ordinary parking facility. Although these results should only be considered as indicative, they do show that decreasing the distance between rows of cars can lead to a much faster fire spread. The simulation also shows that the size of a fire in a relatively closed-off parking facility is not necessarily controlled by the number of cars but by the access to air. Hence, the number of openings and properties of ventilation systems in such facilities are important factors to consider when assessing fire safety. A study of regulations and experiences with semi-automatic parking facilities in Norway and other countries as well as aspects that increase risks in semi-automatic parking facilities was conducted. No specific fire-related experiences were discovered, but this is not surprising when considering that fires in parking facilities are relatively rare and there are relatively few semiautomatic parking facilities. In addition, these types of facilities are relatively new. The study found regulations for fully automatic parking facilities in Norway, but semiautomatic parking facilities are not covered by the same regulations. The current regulations do not ensure that the authorities are informed when automatic car-stacking systems are installed in existing parking facilities that are open to the public. There are no regulations ensuring that a fire safety assessment is conducted when an automatic car-stacking system is installed in an existing building regulated for parking that is accessible to the public. It is our opinion that there is a need for a new assessment of fire safety when a system for car stacking is established in an existing parking facility.

Publisher
p. 46
Series
RISE Rapport ; 2023:37
Keywords
Parking, semi-automatic parking facilities, car-stacking systems, fleet parking, fire safety, fire and rescue services., Parkering, semiautomatiske parkeringsanlegg, bilstablingssystem, flåteparkering, brannsikkerhet, brannvesen.
National Category
Building Technologies
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-64924 (URN)978-91-89757-83-7 (ISBN)
Note

Finansiert av: Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap og Direktoratet for byggkvalitet

Available from: 2023-06-07 Created: 2023-06-07 Last updated: 2024-04-09Bibliographically approved
Sæter Bøe, A., Friquin, K. L., Brandon, D., Steen-Hansen, A. & Ertesvåg, I. (2023). Fire spread in a large compartment with exposed cross-laminated timber and open ventilation conditions: #FRIC-01 – Exposed ceiling. Fire safety journal, 140, Article ID 103869.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Fire spread in a large compartment with exposed cross-laminated timber and open ventilation conditions: #FRIC-01 – Exposed ceiling
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2023 (English)In: Fire safety journal, ISSN 0379-7112, E-ISSN 1873-7226, Vol. 140, article id 103869Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Exposing cross-laminated timber (CLT) structures in buildings is increasingly popular in modern buildings. However, large timber surfaces, window facades, and different geometries can change the fire dynamics in a compartment. The effect of those parameters, therefore, needs to be studied. Two large-scale CLT compartment fire experiments (95 m2) have consequently been performed. The experiments were designed to represent a modern office building with an open-plan space and large window openings. In this experiment, #FRIC-01, the ceiling was exposed. The wood crib fire developed slowly and travelled approximately 1.5 m before the ceiling ignited at 32.5 min. Thereafter the fire spread rapidly across the ceiling and wood crib before it shortly after retracted. Three such cycles of rapid spread followed by a retraction occurred within 13 min, whereby the wood crib fire grew larger for each cycle. After the flames extended through the compartment for the fourth time, the fire remained fully developed. After a short period of intense burning, the CLT self-extinguished while the wood crib fire was still burning. The compartment withstood full burnout, and no reignition occurred despite some delamination and using an adhesive that lacks a demonstrated resistance against glue-line integrity failure. © 2023 The Authors

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier Ltd, 2023
Keywords
CLT, Compartment fire, Fire spread, Large-scale, Self-extinction, Adhesives, Fires, Laminating, Office buildings, Timber, Compartment fires, Condition, Cross laminated, Cross-laminated timber, Laminated timber, Large-scales, Timber structures, Wood crib fire, Ceilings
National Category
Building Technologies
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-65967 (URN)10.1016/j.firesaf.2023.103869 (DOI)2-s2.0-85166625665 (Scopus ID)
Note

The compartment in the experiment was built of CLT elements in three walls and the ceiling, while the fourth wall was almost entirely open with four large openings. The CLT elements in the roof rested on the three CLT walls. They were supported on the fourth wall by a 140 mm × 315 mm glulam beam resting into a pre-cut hole in the CLT end walls and supported by three aerated concrete columns. The inner geometry of the compartment was 18.80 m × 5.00 m x 2.52 m (L x W x H). Deviations up to ±0.05 m were present for the ceiling height caused by a slightly tilted floor, with the highest level by the window wall. The deviations are not included in the drawings. A sketch of the experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1, and pictures of the compartment are given in Figs. 2 and 3.The experiments were conducted at RISE Fire Research in Norway as part of the Fire Research and Innovation Centre (FRIC) (www.fric.no). The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support by the Research Council of Norway through the program BRANNSIKKERHET, project number 294649, and by partners of the research centre FRIC. A special thanks to the FRIC partners StoraEnso, Rockwool, Hunton, and to Saint-Gobain AS and Byggmakker Handel AS for providing building materials. The authors also wish to thank Panos Kotsovinos and David Barber at ARUP, David Lange and Juan P. Hidalgo at The University of Queensland, and Johan Sjöström at RISE for valuable discussions in the planning phase of the experiments.

Available from: 2023-08-23 Created: 2023-08-23 Last updated: 2024-04-09Bibliographically approved
Sæter Bøe, A., Friquin, K. L., Brandon, D., Steen-Hansen, A. & ErtesvÃ¥g, I. S. (2023). Fire spread in a large compartment with exposed cross-laminated timber and open ventilation conditions: #FRIC-02 - Exposed wall and ceiling. Fire safety journal, 141, Article ID 103986.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Fire spread in a large compartment with exposed cross-laminated timber and open ventilation conditions: #FRIC-02 - Exposed wall and ceiling
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2023 (English)In: Fire safety journal, ISSN 0379-7112, E-ISSN 1873-7226, Vol. 141, article id 103986Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Cross-laminated timber (CLT) is becoming increasingly popular due to its many advantages. However, it has been shown that exposed CLT can have a significant effect on fire dynamics and spread rates. Further studies are therefore needed to better understand the impact of CLT to fire safety. Two large-scale CLT compartment fire experiments (95 m2) representing a modern office building have been performed, #FRIC-01 and #FRIC-02. This paper presents the second experiment, #FRIC-02, with exposed CLT on the back wall and the ceiling. The fire developed fast and spread across the room in less than 3.5 min from ignition of the wood crib on the floor and in 1.5 min after the ignition of the ceiling. Large external flames were observed, despite the compartment being well-ventilated. The 5-layer CLT, which comprised a 40 mm thick exposed outer layer and was face-bonded using a common European polyurethane adhesive, exhibited glue-line integrity failure and led to a second flashover after a significant period of decay. Subsequent layers of 20 mm also delaminated before the fire was manually extinguished after 3 h. Compared to #FRIC-01, the fire spread rate was faster, and temperatures, charring rates, heat release rates and external flames were higher. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier Ltd, 2023
Keywords
Adhesives; Ceilings; Flashover; Laminating; Office buildings; Timber; Walls (structural partitions); Compartment fires; Condition; Cross laminated; Cross-laminated timber; External flame; Facade fire; Fire spread; Laminated timber; Large-scales; Second flashover; Fires
National Category
Civil Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-67660 (URN)10.1016/j.firesaf.2023.103986 (DOI)2-s2.0-85173336165 (Scopus ID)
Note

The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support by the Research Council of Norway through the program BRANNSIKKERHET, project number 294649, and by partners of the research centre FRIC.

Available from: 2023-11-29 Created: 2023-11-29 Last updated: 2024-04-09Bibliographically approved
Sæter Bøe, A. (2023). FRIC webinar: Large-scale compartment experiments with exposed Cross-Laminated Timber (CLT)..
Open this publication in new window or tab >>FRIC webinar: Large-scale compartment experiments with exposed Cross-Laminated Timber (CLT).
2023 (English)Other (Other academic)
National Category
Engineering and Technology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-68603 (URN)
Note

ID nummer: FRIC webinar D3.2-2023.04

Available from: 2023-12-14 Created: 2023-12-14 Last updated: 2024-04-09Bibliographically approved
Stolen, R. & Sæter Bøe, A. (2021). BRAVENT – Tetting av ventilasjonsfilter med brannrøyk.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>BRAVENT – Tetting av ventilasjonsfilter med brannrøyk
2021 (Norwegian)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In the series of BRAVENT projects, the goal is to generate documentation and answers  to issues related to ventilation and fire by investigating these experimentally.  

In ventilation systems where the smoke will be extracted through the ventilation system in the event of a fire, it is common practice to install so-called bypass solutions to send the smoke past the ventilation filter in the event of a fire. This is done to avoid clogging the filters with smoke particulates and maintain the airflow through the ventilation ducts. If the airflow in the ventilation system stops, smoke can spread freely in the ventilation ducts between different fire cells. For ventilation systems that will be stopped and sealed by fire rated dampers, this challenge is not relevant. 

Even though this is a common solution, it has been difficult to find documentation that ventilation filters can be clogged by smoke from a fire. As part of BRAVENT, RISE Fire Research has conducted two test series to investigate this problem by drawing fire smoke through a ventilation filter and measuring how quickly the filter clogs. 

In most experiments that were carried out, it took about an hour before the filter was clogged, but there were also experiments where the filter was clogged within a few minutes. This shows that there can be a big difference in how efficiently fire smoke can clog a ventilation filter, but that under certain conditions this can happen very quickly. For example, an experiment where a small amount of polyether foam was burned in addition to wood showed that the filter was clogged quickly. This shows that the clogging rate is highly dependent on the type of fuel. However, in another test where only wood was burned, the filter was clogged in a similar time frame, indicating that also other factors than the fuel are important. It is thus necessary to secure the smoke an alternative route outside the filter if it is necessary to maintain a certain amount of air in the ventilation system in the event of a fire since the ventilation filter can become clogged within a few minutes.

Publisher
p. 31
Series
RISE Rapport ; 2021:32
Keywords
Fire, smoke, ventilation, filters, clogging, bypass
National Category
Building Technologies
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-53000 (URN)978-91-89385-17-7 (ISBN)
Note

Prosjektnummer: 20414. 

Kvalitetssikring: Christoph Meraner. 

Finansiert av: Omsorgsbygg Oslo KF, Undervisningsbygg Oslo KF, Sykehusbygg HF og DiBK Forsidebilde: Røyk blir trekt gjennom ventilasjonskanalar og filter for å undersøke tetting av filter med brannrøyk. Robert Harley Mostad, RISE Fire Research

Available from: 2021-05-17 Created: 2021-05-17 Last updated: 2024-04-09Bibliographically approved
Sæter Bøe, A., Nele Mäger, K., Leikanger Friquin, K. & Just, A. (2021). FRIC Webinar : Charring of wooden I-joists in assemblies with combustible insulation.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>FRIC Webinar : Charring of wooden I-joists in assemblies with combustible insulation
2021 (English)Other (Other academic)
National Category
Natural Sciences
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-56734 (URN)
Note

ID nummer «FRIC webinar D3.1-2021.05c»

Available from: 2021-10-04 Created: 2021-10-04 Last updated: 2024-04-09Bibliographically approved
Fjellgaard Mikalsen, R., Sæter Bøe, A., Meraner, C. & Stölen, R. (2021). From petrol station to multifuel energy station: Changes in fire and explosion safety.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>From petrol station to multifuel energy station: Changes in fire and explosion safety
2021 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

A multifuel energy station is a publicly available station which offers refueling of traditional fossil fuels in combination with one or more alternative energy carriers, such as hydrogen or electric power to electric vehicles. The goal of this study is to survey how the transition from traditional petrol stations to multifuel energy stations affects the fire and explosion risk. Relevant research publications, regulations and guidelines have been studied. Four interviews with relevant stakeholders have been conducted, in addition to correspondence with other stakeholders. The collected information has been used to evaluate and provide a general overview of fire and explosion risk at multifuel energy stations. The scope of the project is limited, and some types of fueling facilities (in conjunction with supermarkets, bus- and industrial facilities), some types of safety challenges (intended acts of sabotage and/or terror), as well as transport of fuel to and from the station, are not included. Availability of different types of fuel in Norway was investigated and three types were selected to be in focus: power for electric vehicles, gaseous hydrogen, as well as hydrogen and methane in liquid form. The selection was based on expected future use, as well as compatibility with the goal of the National Transport Plan that all new vehicles sold from 2025 should be zero emission vehicles. Currently, the category zero emission vehicle includes only electric- and hydrogen vehicles. In facilities that handle flammable, self-reactive, pressurized and explosive substances there is a risk of unwanted incidents. When facilities with hazardous substances comply with current regulations, the risk associated with handling hazardous substances is considered not to be significant compared to other risks in society. When new energy carriers are added, it is central to understand how the transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station will change the fire and explosion risk. Factors that will have an impact include: number and type of ignition sources, number of passenger vehicles and heavy transport vehicles at the station, amount of flammable substances, duration of stay for visitors, complexity of the facility, size of the safety distances, fire service’s extinguishing efforts, environmental impact, maintenance need etc. In addition, each energy carrier entails unique scenarios. By introducing charging stations at multifuel energy stations, additional ignition sources are introduced compared to a traditional petrol station, since the charger itself can be considered as a potential ignition source. The charger and connected car must be placed outside the Ex-zone in accordance with NEK400 (processed Norwegian edition of IEC 60364 series, the CENELEC HD 60364 series and some complementary national standards), in such a way that ignition of potential leaks from fossil fuels or other fuels under normal operation conditions is considered unlikely to occur. A potential danger in the use of rapid charging is electric arcing, which can arise due to poor connections and high electric effect. Electric arcs produce local hot spots, which in turn can contribute to fire ignition. The danger of electric arcs is reduced by, among others, communication between the vehicle and charger, which assures that no charging is taking place before establishing good contact between the two. The communication also assures that it is not possible to drive off with the charger still connected. There are requirements for weekly inspections of the charger and the charging cable, which will contribute to quick discovery and subsequent repair of faults and mechanical wear. Other safety measures to reduce risk include collision protection of the charger, and emergency stop switches that cut the power delivery to all chargers. There is a potential danger of personal injury by electric shock, but this is considered most relevant during installation of the charger and can be reduced to an acceptable level by utilizing certified personnel and limited access for unauthorized personnel. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with charging stations, it is important to take into account the added ignition sources, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. Gaseous hydrogen has different characteristics than conventional fuels at a petrol station, which affect the risk (frequency and consequence). Gaseous hydrogen is flammable, burns quickly and may explode given the right conditions. Furthermore, the gas is stored in high pressure tanks, producing high mechanical rupture energy, and the transport capacity of gaseous hydrogen leads to an increased number of trucks delivering hydrogen, compared with fossil fuels. On the other hand, gaseous hydrogen is light weight and easily rises upwards and dilute. In the case of a fire the flame has low radiant heat and heating outside the flame itself is limited. Important safety measures are open facilities, safe connections for high pressure fueling, and facilitate for pressure relief in a safe direction by the use of valves and sectioning, so that the gas is led upwards in a safe direction in case of a leakage. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with gaseous hydrogen, it is important to take into account the explosion hazard, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. Liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid methane (LNG, LBG) are stored at very low temperatures and at a relatively low pressure. Leakages may result in cryogenic (very cold) leakages which may lead to personal injuries and embrittlement of materials such as steels. Critical installations which may be exposed to cryogenic leakages must be able to withstand these temperatures. In addition, physical boundaries to limit uncontrolled spreading of leakages should be established. Evaporation from tanks must be ventilated through safety valves. During a fire, the safety valves must not be drenched in extinguishing water, as they may freeze and seal. Leakages of liquid methane and liquid hydrogen will evaporate and form flammable and explosive gas clouds. Liquid hydrogen is kept at such a low temperature that uninsulated surfaces may cause air to condense and form liquid oxygen, which may give an intense fire or explosion when reacting with organic material. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with liquid hydrogen and liquid methane, it is important to take into account the cryogenic temperatures during storage and that it must be possible to ventilate off any gas formed by evaporation from a liquid leakage, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors. For the combination of more than one alternative energy carrier combined with fuels of a conventional petrol station, two areas of challenges have been identified: area challenges and cascading effects. Area challenges are due to the fact that risks to the surroundings must be evaluated based on all activity in the facility. When increasing the number of fueling systems within an area, the frequency of unwanted incidents at a given point in the facility is summarized (simply put). If two energy carriers are placed in too close proximity to each other, the risk can be disproportionately high. During construction, the fueling systems must be placed with sufficient space between them. In densely populated areas, shortage of space may limit the development. Cascading effects is a chain of events which starts small and grows larger, here due to an incident involving one energy carrier spreading to another. This may occur due to ignited liquid leakages which may flow to below a gas tank, or by explosion- or fire related damages to nearby installations due to shock waves, flying debris or flames. Good technical and organizational measures are important, such as sufficient training of personnel, follow-up and facility inspections, especially during start-up after installing a new energy carrier. The transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station could not only give negative cascading effects, since sectionalizing of energy carriers, with lower storage volume per energy carrier, as well as physical separation between these, may give a reduction in the potential extent of damage of each facility. Apart from area challenges and cascading effects no other combination challenges, such a chemical interaction challenges, have been identified to potentially affect the fire and explosion risk. For future work it will be important to keep an eye on the development, nationally and internationally, since it is still too early to predict which energy carriers that will be most utilized in the future. If electric heavy transport (larger batteries and the need for fast charging with higher effect) become more common, it will be necessary to develop a plan and evaluate the risks of charging these at multifuel energy stations. For hydrogen there is a need for more knowledge on how the heat of a jet fire (ignited, pressurized leakage) affects impinged objects. There is also a general need for experimental and numerical research on liquid hydrogen and methane due to many knowledge gaps on the topic. During operation of the facilities and through potential unwanted incidents, new knowledge will be gained, and this knowledge must be utilized in order to update recommendations linked to the risk of fire and explosion in multifuel energy stations.

Publisher
p. 65
Series
RISE Rapport ; 2021:26
Keywords
Multi fuel energy station, energy station, safety, fuel, DC fast charging, quick charging, rapid charging, hydrogen, new energy carriers.
National Category
Engineering and Technology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-56638 (URN)978-91-89385-11-5 (ISBN)
Available from: 2021-09-21 Created: 2021-09-21 Last updated: 2024-04-09Bibliographically approved
Fjellgaard Mikalsen, R., Sæter Bøe, A., Meraner, C. & Stolen, R. (2020). Fra bensinstasjon til energistasjon: Endring av brann- og eksplosjonssikkerhet.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Fra bensinstasjon til energistasjon: Endring av brann- og eksplosjonssikkerhet
2020 (Norwegian)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

From petrol station to multifuel energy station: Changes in fire and explosion safety

A multifuel energy station is a publicly available station which offers refueling of traditional fossil fuels in combination with one or more alternative energy carriers, such as hydrogen or electric power to electric vehicles. The goal of this study is to survey how the transition from traditional petrol stations to multifuel energy stations affects the fire and explosion risk.

Relevant research publications, regulations and guidelines have been studied. Four interviews with relevant stakeholders have been conducted, in addition to correspondence with other stakeholders. The collected information has been used to evaluate and provide a general overview of fire and explosion risk at multifuel energy stations. The scope of the project is limited, and some types of fueling facilities (in conjunction with supermarkets, bus- and industrial facilities), some types of safety challenges (intended acts of sabotage and/or terror), as well as transport of fuel to and from the station, are not included.

Availability of different types of fuel in Norway was investigated and three types were selected to be in focus: power for electric vehicles, gaseous hydrogen, as well as hydrogen and methane in liquid form. The selection was based on expected future use, as well as compatibility with the goal of the National Transport Plan that all new vehicles sold from 2025 should be zero emission vehicles. Currently, the category zero emission vehicle includes only electric- and hydrogen vehicles.

In facilities that handle flammable, self-reactive, pressurized and explosive substances there is a risk of unwanted incidents. When facilities with hazardous substances comply with current regulations, the risk associated with handling hazardous substances is considered not to be significant compared to other risks in society. When new energy carriers are added, it is central to understand how the transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station will change the fire and explosion risk. Factors that will have an impact include: number and type of ignition sources, number of passenger vehicles and heavy transport vehicles at the station, amount of flammable substances, duration of stay for visitors, complexity of the facility, size of the safety distances, fire service’s extinguishing efforts, environmental impact, maintenance need etc. In addition, each energy carrier entails unique scenarios.

By introducing charging stations at multifuel energy stations, additional ignition sources are introduced compared to a traditional petrol station, since the charger itself can be considered as a potential ignition source. The charger and connected car must be placed outside the Ex-zone in accordance with NEK400 (processed Norwegian edition of IEC 60364 series, the CENELEC HD 60364 series and some complementary national standards), in such a way that ignition of potential leaks from fossil fuels or other fuels under normal operation conditions is considered unlikely to occur. A potential danger in the use of rapid charging is electric arcing, which can arise due to poor connections and high electric effect. Electric arcs produce local hot spots, which in turn can contribute to fire ignition. The danger of electric arcs is reduced by, among others, communication between the vehicle and charger, which assures that no charging is taking place before establishing good contact between the two. The communication also assures that it is not possible to drive off with the charger still connected. There are requirements for weekly inspections of the charger and the charging cable, which will contribute to quick discovery and subsequent repair of faults and mechanical wear. Other safety measures to reduce risk include collision protection of the charger, and emergency stop switches that cut the power delivery to all chargers. There is a potential danger of personal injury by electric shock, but this is considered most relevant during installation of the charger and can be reduced to an acceptable level by utilizing certified personnel and limited access for unauthorized personnel. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with charging stations, it is important to take into account the added ignition sources, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

Gaseous hydrogen has different characteristics than conventional fuels at a petrol station, which affect the risk (frequency and consequence). Gaseous hydrogen is flammable, burns quickly and may explode given the right conditions. Furthermore, the gas is stored in high pressure tanks, producing high mechanical rupture energy, and the transport capacity of gaseous hydrogen leads to an increased number of trucks delivering hydrogen, compared with fossil fuels. On the other hand, gaseous hydrogen is light weight and easily rises upwards and dilute. In the case of a fire the flame has low radiant heat and heating outside the flame itself is limited. Important safety measures are open facilities, safe connections for high pressure fueling, and facilitate for pressure relief in a safe direction by the use of valves and sectioning, so that the gas is led upwards in a safe direction in case of a leakage. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with gaseous hydrogen, it is important to take into account the explosion hazard, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

Liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid methane (LNG, LBG) are stored at very low temperatures and at a relatively low pressure. Leakages may result in cryogenic (very cold) leakages which may lead to personal injuries and embrittlement of materials such as steels. Critical installations which may be exposed to cryogenic leakages must be able to withstand these temperatures. In addition, physical boundaries to limit uncontrolled spreading of leakages should be established. Evaporation from tanks must be ventilated through safety valves. During a fire, the safety valves must not be drenched in extinguishing water, as they may freeze and seal. Leakages of liquid methane and liquid hydrogen will evaporate and form flammable and explosive gas clouds. Liquid hydrogen is kept at such a low temperature that uninsulated surfaces may cause air to condense and form liquid oxygen, which may give an intense fire or explosion when reacting with organic material. For risk assessments and risk evaluations of each individual facility with liquid hydrogen and liquid methane, it is important to take into account the cryogenic temperatures during storage and that it must be possible to ventilate off any gas formed by evaporation from a liquid leakage, as well as the other mentioned factors, in addition to facility specific factors.

For the combination of more than one alternative energy carrier combined with fuels of a conventional petrol station, two areas of challenges have been identified: area challenges and cascade effects. Area challenges are due to the fact that risks to the surroundings must be evaluated based on all activity in the facility. When increasing the number of fueling systems within an area, the frequency of unwanted incidents at a given point in the facility is summarized (simply put). If two energy carriers are placed in too close proximity to each other, the risk can be disproportionately high. During construction, the fueling systems must be placed with sufficient space between them. In densely populated areas, shortage of space may limit the development. Cascade effects is a chain of events which starts small and grows larger, here due to an incident involving one energy carrier spreading to another. This may occur due to ignited liquid leakages which may flow to below a gas tank, or by explosion- or fire related damages to nearby installations due to shock waves, flying debris or flames. Good technical and organizational measures are important, such as sufficient training of personnel, follow-up and facility inspections, especially during start-up after installing a new energy carrier. The transition from a traditional petrol station to a multifuel energy station could not only give negative cascade effects, since sectionalizing of energy carriers, with lower storage volume per energy carrier, as well as physical separation between these, may give a reduction in the potential extent of damage of each facility. Apart from area challenges and cascade effects no other combination challenges, such a chemical interaction challenges, have been identified to potentially affect the fire and explosion risk.

For future work it will be important to keep an eye on the development, nationally and internationally, since it is still too early to predict which energy carriers that will be most utilized in the future. If electric heavy transport (larger batteries and the need for fast charging with higher effect) become more common, it will be necessary to develop a plan and evaluate the risks of charging these at multifuel energy stations. For hydrogen there is a need for more knowledge on how the heat of a jet fire (ignited, pressurized leakage) affects impinged objects. There is also a general need for experimental and numerical research on liquid hydrogen and methane due to many knowledge gaps on the topic. During operation of the facilities and through potential unwanted incidents, new knowledge will be gained, and this knowledge must be utilized in order to update recommendations linked to the risk of fire and explosion in multifuel energy stations.

Publisher
p. 62
Series
RISE Rapport ; 2020:11
Keywords
Multifuel energy station, energy station, safety, fuel, DC fast charging, quick charging, rapid charging, hydrogen, new energy carriers, Energistasjon, sikkerhet, drivstoff, hurtiglading, hydrogen, nye energibærere
National Category
Engineering and Technology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-50739 (URN)9789189049918 (ISBN)
Available from: 2020-11-18 Created: 2020-11-18 Last updated: 2024-04-09
Sæter Bøe, A. & Glansberg, K. (2019). Brannrisiko ved lagring av ikke-tilkoblede litium-ion og litiumbatterier.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Brannrisiko ved lagring av ikke-tilkoblede litium-ion og litiumbatterier
2019 (Norwegian)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Fire risk associated with storage of Lithium- and Lithium-ion batteries

In this project we have been in contact with several different actors that handle and store large quantities of non-connected lithium and lithium-ion batteries. Batteries will, during their lifetime, be stored at different locations, and the locations that are considered to have the largest amount of batteries are manufacturers / distributors and recycling plants.

For operators who store large quantities of new batteries, it is common to store the batteries on pallets in conventional storage buildings secured by a water sprinkler system. Based on information from the plants we have been in contact with, we consider the fire risk to be about the same as an ordinary warehouse. Factors that may affect the fire risk are: The amount of batteries, battery state of charge, possible ignition sources, general fire protection of the storage, and knowledge of battery-related fire. One possible cause of fire during storage and handling of batteries in a warehouse is due to mechanical damage, for example by a falling pallet from truck. Mechanical damage can cause internal short-circuits in the battery cells, which will generate heat, and possibly a fire. Handling by truck is in itself a possible source of ignition as there are examples that a truck has started to burn both during charging and while driving.

At a battery packaging facility we have been in contact with, who receives battery cells directly from a manufacturer, the cells had a charge state of 20 % and were packed according to the transport standard UN 3480. The focus on fire safety and the knowledge of batteries in general was high.

For actors distributing batteries as part of a larger product assortment, the amount of batteries will be substantially smaller, and knowledge of battery-related fire will normally be less. The charging state of batteries in such warehouses is stated to be higher than that of the manufacturer and may be about 50 – 95 %. A high state of charge makes the cells more unstable and based on this we believe that the risk is somewhat higher for such storage, than storage of battery cells with lower charge levels.

At recycling facilities, there is a significantly higher fire risk than storage of new batteries in storage, mainly because cells have been (and are) subject to mechanical stresses in the form of vibrations and shocks, which can lead to more unstable cells and possibly lead to internal short circuits. External short circuits can also occur if the terminals of a battery come into contact through a low-resistance connection. The recycling plants we have been in contact with, have a high focus on fire safety and have taken a number of precautions to prevent a fire to occur, and have put in place measures that can prevent a small fire to develop into a larger fire. The recycling plants seem to have good control over the fire risk of batteries that are checked and sorted, while the fire risk is somewhat higher in the area where the batteries can be unsorted and not currently controlled. Several of the recycling plants experience regular fire outbreaks caused by lithium / lithium-ion batteries, but these cases are normally handled with simple fire extinguishing measures on site.

Based on those we have been in contact with, we believe that the actors with the greatest amount of batteries also have a high focus on fire safety and a great deal of knowledge about battery safety, which together pose an acceptable risk.

The fire risk for actors handling and storing smaller amounts of batteries may be higher, as there is less focus on and knowledge of battery safety.

As the result of this project mainly is based on visiting different actors, there may be other actors with a slightly different focus on fire safety and knowledge about batteries.

The following learning points have been extracted:

General• Have good procedures to reduce fire risk.• Ensure that practices comply with procedures.

Storage of batteries in stock• Keep the cells in as low charge state as possible. When packaging according to UN 3480, this is automatically fulfilled.• Have good dialogue with the local fire department.• Have good truck driving routines to avoid dropping pallets.• Place possible sources of ignition (e.g. truck charger) at a sufficient distance from combustible materials.

Batteries at recycling plants• Limit the amount of batteries in one place.• Store different battery types separated in appropriate storage containers, in a dry location.• Ensure that degassing from batteries may not lead to accumulation of combustible gases.• Keep combustible materials at a safe distance.• Provide a safe zone where unstable batteries can temporarily be stored.• Ensure good training of employees.• Have general order and orderliness.• Access to local fire extinguishing equipment.• Have good dialogue with the local fire department.• Provide good access for the fire service.

Further work is needed to document the fire characteristics of a pallet of non-connected battery cells, in the form of full-scale fire tests to document flammability, fire spread and fire dynamics, and how such a fire can be extinguished.

Publisher
p. 50
Series
RISE Rapport ; 2019:98
Keywords
fire, battery, storage
National Category
Engineering and Technology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-44758 (URN)978-91-89049-28-4 (ISBN)
Available from: 2020-04-22 Created: 2020-04-22 Last updated: 2024-04-09
Sæter Bøe, A., Sesseng, C. & Stensaas, J. P. (2019). BRAVENT – Delrapport 1 : Teori- og kunnskapssammenstilling.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>BRAVENT – Delrapport 1 : Teori- og kunnskapssammenstilling
2019 (Norwegian)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Recently questions about whether spread of heat and smoke in ventilation ducts during a fire represent an increased risk for personal safety and loss of properties have been raised. The technical solutions currently used to fulfill the pre-accepted performance given in the guidelines to the building regulations with regard to fire protection of ventilation ducts are largely based on descriptions in SINTEF's Building Design Sheet 520.352 on fire- and smoke protection of ventilation systems, and in BV Netts Guide for fireproof ventilation, also known as the BVNett Guide. This topic was once again raised in connection with the revision of the 2017 edition of the building regulations, when it was pointed out in inquiry statements that the pre-accepted performances are insufficiently defined and that the solutions outlined in the Building Design Sheet and the BVNett Guide are not sufficiently documented.

In order to elucidate this topic and provide scientific documentation on the extent to which the spread of heat and smoke in ventilation ducts represents a risk to persons and properties, the BRAVENT project (Fire and smoke spread in ventilation ducts) was initiated.

The project investigates issues related to heat dissipation in ventilation ducts, clogging of filters in ventilation systems due to smoke, the effect of the seal-up strategy with respect to pressure build-up in the fire room and smoke spread through leakages in the construction.

The objective of the sub-task presented in this report was to:

Compile a theoretical basis for the experiments and analyzes to be carried out.

1. Map relevant regulations for fire protection of ventilation systems.

2. Map standards that are the basis for determining the fire resistance of components included in a ventilation system.

3. Map the state-of-the-art regarding a. the need to fire insulate ventilation ducts.

b. the need to install bypass channels to prevent the filter systems from being clogged by smoke particles.

c. the effect of installing fire dampers in all fire-partitions with respect to smoke spread.

d. how smoke can be spread via ventilation ducts and leaks in the building structure.

e. the pros and cons of seal-up and extraction strategies.

© RISE Research Institutes of Sweden

This is sub-report 1, which summarizes the relevant, fire-related theory and state-of-the-art in the focus area. The report serves as the theoretical basis for planning of experiments and for the other activities in the BRAVENT project.

Publisher
p. 73
Series
RISE Rapport ; 20119:11
Keywords
fire, ventilation, HVAC, insulation
National Category
Natural Sciences
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-37535 (URN)978-91-88695-97-0 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-01-23 Created: 2019-01-23 Last updated: 2024-04-09Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0003-2396-1325

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