An accident on a passenger ferry may lead to evacuation using lifeboats or liferafts, a process that can be both complex and hazardous. This paper investigates the level of safety for passengers during evacuation based on field study and interview data. In the analysis, the eight goals of Universal Design (UD) were tailored and used to explore what ship and interior characteristics influence evacuation performance and the demands placed on the crew and passengers, and whether all passengers have equal chances of completing evacuation safely. Results suggest that while a ship may fulfil regulation, completing an evacuation may pose challenges for passengers with varying abilities, for example, when attempting to perceive emergency information or move through the ship. In addition, it was found that an evacuation may present the crew with challenges and difficult trade-offs that are not always accounted for in the ship’s design, equipment and safety organization. It is concluded that the use of a UD approach in ship design, based on a truthful representation of passenger demographics, could enhance passenger safety and provide for evacuation on equal terms.

Many advancements are being made within the domain of autonomous shipping, motivating discussions of corresponding amendments to international safety regulations within the International Maritime Organization. Near-coastal passenger ferries are a form of sea traffic that has been the target of automation trials due to their short voyages and relatively protected waters of operation. This study investigated emergency evacuation from a range of such ships, covering both the current situation (focused on crew tasks, external rescue actors and interactions) and safety aspects that should be considered when automation brings about new work patterns, such as remote supervision and control. The study employed qualitative methods – interviews, field visits and a stakeholder workshop. Results give insight into ferry evacuation processes and challenges in their current form. In addition, results from the application of different automated evacuation scenarios suggest that more detailed studies are needed within the areas of remote operation situation awareness, remote operator and onboard personnel competencies, passenger safety information and communication, simple and robust evacuation equipment, technical means allowing assistance between autonomous and regular ships, and lastly, both procedures and interfaces for collaboration in a changing rescue network. 

Den kustnära färjetrafiken är en tacksam miljö för att testa nya automationslösningar. Här finns många fartyg som trafikerar relativt lugna vatten och där bemanningen redan idag är begränsad till en eller två personer. Men förändringar i teknik och bemanning kommer också kräva nya perspektiv i säkerhetsarbetet. I projektet SPECTRUM har besättningens roll vid en nödevakuering undersökts och jämförts med olika automationsscenarier för kustnära färjetrafik. Resultatet pekar ut områden där fortsatt forskning och utveckling är nödvändig för att säkerställa att en evakuering av ett fartyg kan genomföras med så goda förutsättningar som möjligt - om bemanningen reduceras, yrkesroller förändras eller om besättningen ersätts med automationslösningar.

Managing an onboard fire is a time sensitive process where smooth action and collaboration amongst the crew is key to good outcomes. These actions and interactions, however, are heavily influenced by ship design. Information that is difficult to collect, systems that create confusion and disturbances in the bridge environment are all factors that may lead to delays, and ultimately, to an aggravated fire scenario.

Fire safety design is often treated as a purely technical issue, with a focus on technical performance and rule compliance. But when a fire occurs, gaining control requires correct and timely actions from the crew. Providing the crew with the right tools for this job – purposefully designing onboard environments, systems and tools according to their needs – is an underused and powerful approach to fire safety. This guide sets out from an activity-centered perspective, that is, a strong emphasis on what the crew needs to do in the event of fire, and how those actions can be supported. The purpose of this guide is to show how such an approach can be applied in the early phases of a ship newbuild project.

Vessel Traffic Service Operators (VTSOs) employ their experience and problem-solving skills in order to uphold safety in the controlled traffic area. Human Factors studies focus on the conditions of that work – whether technologies, organizations and interfaces to other stakeholders are adapted to VTS operator activities and needs. For the VTS, the purpose of Sea Traffic Management (STM) services is to allow digital communication and information sharing between the VTS Centre and ships in the controlled area, with an emphasis on simple creation and sharing of ship routes. The aim of this evaluation has been to uncover Human Factors hazards associated with the introduction of STM services developed in STM BALT SAFE WP4, directed towards route creation, sharing and associated safety functions. Analyses have concentrated on three levels of interaction within the sea traffic system: 1. The VTS operator and her immediate working environment (usability and ergonomics of VTS systems and tools affected by STM implementation). 2. The organization of VTS collaboration with other actors in the port and its surroundings. 3. Interaction in the greater context of ship traffic (including both STM and non-STM ships). The evaluation was performed using qualitative methods in a process consisting of three main stages – A first analysis using heuristics from the domain of Human Reliability Analysis, an interview study with sea traffic system stakeholders, and a VTS simulator study. Results indicate that maritime administrations should employ a consistent design process that caters for local VTS Centre characteristics and the needs of their operators. As work with STM continues, technical development should be augmented with an iterative development of VTS system user experience and usability. Aspects of STM that are already known to require a human factors validation are, but not limited to: • That the new information provided to operators through the STM services is presented in a way that does not introduce confusion or obscure information (e.g. cluttering of routes, poor visibility of ships/routes/geographical features). • That alarms and/or alerts are relevant, useful and communicated effectively. Irrelevant alarms or alerts can disturb the work of the VTSO, and even if only relevant alerts are provided, the sum of all alerts can still produce a poor working environment (e.g. with regard to noise). • That STM services are coupled with sufficient support for notetaking and/or marking. With a larger bulk of information available to the operator (e.g. around possible future hazards) comes a larger need to support the operator attention and memory. • That the implementation of STM functions accounts for information management over several work shifts. • That predictive tools (e.g. prediction of future ship movements and associated conflicts) factor in prediction uncertainty, so that the operator is given a truthful representation of possible traffic development. • That there are means of communication suitable for use with the STM functions. Even though chat functionality was excluded from the STM BALT SAFE scope, some informants hold that other means of communication than VHF might be necessary if the ship is to send its route before reaching the VTS area. • That dynamics in VTS-ship interaction may be affected as new forms of communication develop. For example, even if the purpose of the VTS Centre is only to “inform” ships about traffic conditions, creating and sharing routes via STM services might be regarded as something more than a friendly suggestion. This invokes a discussion around VTS authority and responsibility in the event of an incident that needs to be continued. Evaluation data suggests that the use of STM functionality is not appropriate for all operative conditions, and that implementation must be calibrated against the practical needs of local VTS operators. Here, a balance must be struck between allowing for local adaption of STM services and offering a uniform STM interface towards vessels moving between different control areas. A final aspect of adaptation is the relation between VTS technical functionality and how these functionalities are put to practical use. Seeing that STM services could expand the operator time horizon and allow them to work more proactively, technical development should be combined with a review of local VTS procedures, making sure that the VTS operational approach (e.g. procedures for ship interaction or the functional level of VTS implementation) matches all the capabilities afforded by STM.

Many studies show that humans contribute to accidents, but research rarely addresses all the accidents that are avoided thanks to human capabilities. Today there is an interest in autonomous vessels and automation within shipping, often with arguments for safety and efficiency. Research from other domains suggests that automation can have unintended side-effects. Instead of increasing safety, automation may undermine people’s ability to understand the situation and make decisions, introducing new risks to the processes. To conclude that the frequency of accidents will be reduced proportionally to the people removed from the system neglects the dynamics of the socio-technical system and the positive human impact on maritime safety. Although shipping around Åland is not free of accidents and incidents, the system has a very good safety performance. The main purpose of the analysis is to analyze human impact on safe operation and performance exemplified by the vessels in Åland’s ferry lines. 

Fires on RoPax ships can be very challenging and may inflict serious damage both to life,environment and property. The SEBRA project explored two different research themesthrough interviews and observations on four larger RoPax ships – firstly, the interactionbetween the crew, installations and environments relevant for fire protection, secondly,what governs the design of fire protective installations and working environmentsonboard.The study shows that proactive fire safety is a continuous process where the crews appliesmany different types of knowledge and experience. Several of the success factors identifiedin the study can be linked to prior research on resilient performance in critical operationsi.e. properties that allow people to deal with problems that are surprising and donot fully match existing routines.Key factors for good performance in the case of fire are good working conditions andeffective training, meaning working environments, systems, organizations and routinesthat fit the needs of the crew. However, the present study shows that a holistic approachis rarely applied to fire safety. Safety Management has a reactive bias, a clear focus oncompliance and pays limited attention to usability as a driver for safety. Observationsresulted in several findings of poor design that could undermine performance in the caseof a real fire.Flaws in fire safety design can be traced to the overall processes of ship design, buildingand revision. Ship design is a processed closely focused on cost and technical demands,rarely concerned with user needs and characteristics. When the fire protection consultantbecomes involved, many important design parameters are normally fixed and thereis little room for user-oriented fire installations and concerns.Future research is needed to strengthen shipping company learning processes and to giveusability a more prominent role in maritime Safety Management. There is also a need ofresearch demonstrating how usability can be integrated as a key value in ship design.

Industrial fires are associated with many challenges and potentially large consequencesfor life, environment and property. The SEBRA project aimed to investigate preconditionsfor a well-functioning fire safety system, applying a systems perspective on workand safety. Three main themes were explored through field work on Swedish industrialworkplaces; (1) How do operations and the staff interact with fire safety installations ineveryday work, (2) What is the main focus of fire safety design, how is it conducted andhow do the end results affect fire safety and (3) What are the success factors behind positiveoutcomes from incidents where the personnel alone has dealt with fires.During the course of operations conflicts may occur between production and fire safetysolutions e.g. fire doors, detectors, alarm systems and procedures, sometimes to thepoint where fire protective routines or installations are bypassed. A common answer tosuch issues is to strengthen administrative barriers such as rules, safety information andtraining. However, in an industrial organization where resources are already strained,even more checks and routines will only run the risk of aggravating the problem at hand.When an industrial building is constructed there are no processes or methods that canprotect user needs in the design of fire protection. In construction, the main incitementis to minimize cost. When user adaptation is disregarded, costs are effectively transferredto the operational stage in the forms of more inefficient production and lower safety levels.The industry needs to develop ways of understanding and incorporating long-term operativeneeds in short-term construction projects, so that fire protection can be moreclosely fitted to the circumstances and demands of operative personnel

Humans, especially the crews have an important role in the safe operation of ships. The crews, given the right circumstances are able to safely maneuver, navigate, maintain and operate the vessel. The crews are dependent on many factors that enable this work, from the design of the vessel and work place, the procedures, processes given by the ship management and the business approach the ship owner applies to the vessel.

The traffic to and from Åland is an advanced transport system that enables safe ferry services in shipping fairways with narrow passages, meeting and crossing traffic as well as winter navigation - a shipping system combining people and technology to create safe transport.

The introduction of more automation requires a systems perspective and will not be a straight forward development. Total autonomy as proposed by some technology developers is often neglecting the functions and roles that humans have on maritime safety and the business case for increased automation neglects the full contribution of humans onboard. Total autonomy will therefore require high-end products that are built on standardized complex systems. Controlling and monitoring these systems will set new requirements on operators to uphold situated understanding in these complex systems.

Many aspects will be affected by increased automation towards smart shipping - regulations, organization, workplace, working methods, HMI, roles and skills. To cope with the foreseen changes it is important to develop further training, skills, experience, openness in the organization and familiarization giving the future crews the right pre-conditions to succeed in the future, as well as mindful design and integration of newly automated systems

In the future, the ISM code will likely have to change to improve the interaction between land organisations and crews in order to facilitate better integration of split responsibilities and split physical locations by the management system which in the long run allows for an increased land-based monitoring and control

of vessels’ systems and move certain tasks to shore to lower workload onboard, which should be one of the main drivers for automation.

September 2015 saw a sharp increase in the influx of refugees in the Øresund region. In this study, resilience defined as flexible adaptation was taken as a baseline to guide interviews with societal infrastructure actors and NGOs engaged in managing the situation. Different actors had different organisational preconditions that influenced their ability to adapt to the new situation. Among the strongest drivers behind resilient performance were the organisation’s ways of relating to established rules, regulations, procedures and processes, the way relationships were formed between people and hierarchical layers within the organisations, and the perceived value of the human operator and the human contribution within the organisational whole. These values, in turn, determined how the organisations shaped many of the basic conditions that allowed resilient performance to develop. In the study it was found, for public actors in particular, that the criteria necessary to adapt to the situation were not met by organisational structures and processes.