An accident on a passenger ferry may lead to evacuation using lifeboats or liferafts, a process that can be both complex and hazardous. This paper investigates the level of safety for passengers during evacuation based on field study and interview data. In the analysis, the eight goals of Universal Design (UD) were tailored and used to explore what ship and interior characteristics influence evacuation performance and the demands placed on the crew and passengers, and whether all passengers have equal chances of completing evacuation safely. Results suggest that while a ship may fulfil regulation, completing an evacuation may pose challenges for passengers with varying abilities, for example, when attempting to perceive emergency information or move through the ship. In addition, it was found that an evacuation may present the crew with challenges and difficult trade-offs that are not always accounted for in the ship’s design, equipment and safety organization. It is concluded that the use of a UD approach in ship design, based on a truthful representation of passenger demographics, could enhance passenger safety and provide for evacuation on equal terms.

Every day, thousands of vessels of varying sizes traverse the world’s seas, posing significant risks of ship loss, cargo damage, and loss of crew lives due to onboard fires, which can rapidly escalate beyond control. With the ongoing advancement towards highly automated or autonomous ships, the challenge of ensuring an adequate number of experienced firefighters onboard will diminish. Consequently, enabling external firefighting personnel or operators stationed in control rooms to oversee the overall situation becomes crucial in guiding less-experienced crew members in fire containment and prevention efforts. This necessity for future autonomous vessels and current manned ones underscores the importance of enhancing shared situational awareness and establishing platforms for informed decision-making and communication. Ships comprise multiple decks housing various sensors, firefighting equipment, and cargo with different risk classifications. For fire chiefs and control room operators stationed on the ship bridge or on land, early detection of fires and the implementation of appropriate measures to mitigate risks are essential. This paper presents the design of a digital fire central (DFC), developed through a human-centred design process and evaluated by three fire chiefs aboard Roll-on-Roll-Off (Ro-Ro) ships. The primary focus lies in detailing the design process and presenting initial insights from user evaluations.

The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) tools in aviation necessitates more research into human-autonomy teaming in these domain settings. This paper describes the development of a design framework for supporting Human Factors novices in considering human factors, improving human-autonomy collaboration, and maintaining safety when developing AI tools for aviation settings. Combining elements of Hierarchical Task Analysis, Coactive Design, and Types and Levels of Autonomy, the design framework provides guidance in three phases: modelling and understanding the existing system and associated tasks; producing a new function allocation for optimal Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT); and assessing HAT-related risks of the proposed design. In this framework, designers generate a comprehensive set of design considerations to support subsequent development processes. Framework limitations and future research avenues are discussed. 

Many advancements are being made within the domain of autonomous shipping, motivating discussions of corresponding amendments to international safety regulations within the International Maritime Organization. Near-coastal passenger ferries are a form of sea traffic that has been the target of automation trials due to their short voyages and relatively protected waters of operation. This study investigated emergency evacuation from a range of such ships, covering both the current situation (focused on crew tasks, external rescue actors and interactions) and safety aspects that should be considered when automation brings about new work patterns, such as remote supervision and control. The study employed qualitative methods – interviews, field visits and a stakeholder workshop. Results give insight into ferry evacuation processes and challenges in their current form. In addition, results from the application of different automated evacuation scenarios suggest that more detailed studies are needed within the areas of remote operation situation awareness, remote operator and onboard personnel competencies, passenger safety information and communication, simple and robust evacuation equipment, technical means allowing assistance between autonomous and regular ships, and lastly, both procedures and interfaces for collaboration in a changing rescue network. 

Den kustnära färjetrafiken är en tacksam miljö för att testa nya automationslösningar. Här finns många fartyg som trafikerar relativt lugna vatten och där bemanningen redan idag är begränsad till en eller två personer. Men förändringar i teknik och bemanning kommer också kräva nya perspektiv i säkerhetsarbetet. I projektet SPECTRUM har besättningens roll vid en nödevakuering undersökts och jämförts med olika automationsscenarier för kustnära färjetrafik. Resultatet pekar ut områden där fortsatt forskning och utveckling är nödvändig för att säkerställa att en evakuering av ett fartyg kan genomföras med så goda förutsättningar som möjligt - om bemanningen reduceras, yrkesroller förändras eller om besättningen ersätts med automationslösningar.

Managing an onboard fire is a time sensitive process where smooth action and collaboration amongst the crew is key to good outcomes. These actions and interactions, however, are heavily influenced by ship design. Information that is difficult to collect, systems that create confusion and disturbances in the bridge environment are all factors that may lead to delays, and ultimately, to an aggravated fire scenario.

Fire safety design is often treated as a purely technical issue, with a focus on technical performance and rule compliance. But when a fire occurs, gaining control requires correct and timely actions from the crew. Providing the crew with the right tools for this job – purposefully designing onboard environments, systems and tools according to their needs – is an underused and powerful approach to fire safety. This guide sets out from an activity-centered perspective, that is, a strong emphasis on what the crew needs to do in the event of fire, and how those actions can be supported. The purpose of this guide is to show how such an approach can be applied in the early phases of a ship newbuild project.

The project BREND investigated risk with alternative fuel vehicles inside ro-ro spaces. BREND 2.0 is a continuation and has in particular investigated two of the major risks identified in BREND, namely the risk of toxic gases from electric vehicle fires and the risk of a pressure vessel explosion for fire exposed biogas or hydrogen vehicle tanks. Simulations of electric vehicle fires inside a ro-ro space based on real input fire data has been performed. Field experiments that investigate the conditions that can lead to pressure vessel explosion were made with fire exposed biogas and hydrogen tanks. Recommendations are given about how ro-ro space fires in alternative fuel vehicles, or indeed any vehicle fire, can be managed.

The level of protection for personal protective equipment (PPE) in firefighting is important for Swedish shipowners; they want to be sure that the equipment they provide is sufficiently safe for the types of fires that can occur onboard. Shipowners also want to be updated on risks related to the carriage of alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs). Safety products and equipment used onboard ships with a European flag must be certified in accordance with the Marine Equipment Directive (MED) and follow the regulations in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). For fire suits, this means that they must be certified according to one of three standards listed in MED. Two of these standards cover suits used in special cases, with very intense radiant heat, and should only be worn for short periods. The third standard, EN 469, is the same standard that is referred to the PPE Regulation 2016/42, making EN 469-approved fire suits used among European firefighters ashore. However, EN 469 contains two different performance levels where the lower level is not suitable for protection against risks encountered when fighting fires in enclosures. Based on a user study and a risk assessment for AFVs, a set of suggested changes to MED and SOLAS were prepared, together with a set of recommendations for operators that were found important but not subject for regulations. A ready-to-use quick guide, containing the most important results, has been developed for operators.

Vessel Traffic Service Operators (VTSOs) employ their experience and problem-solving skills in order to uphold safety in the controlled traffic area. Human Factors studies focus on the conditions of that work – whether technologies, organizations and interfaces to other stakeholders are adapted to VTS operator activities and needs. For the VTS, the purpose of Sea Traffic Management (STM) services is to allow digital communication and information sharing between the VTS Centre and ships in the controlled area, with an emphasis on simple creation and sharing of ship routes. The aim of this evaluation has been to uncover Human Factors hazards associated with the introduction of STM services developed in STM BALT SAFE WP4, directed towards route creation, sharing and associated safety functions. Analyses have concentrated on three levels of interaction within the sea traffic system: 1. The VTS operator and her immediate working environment (usability and ergonomics of VTS systems and tools affected by STM implementation). 2. The organization of VTS collaboration with other actors in the port and its surroundings. 3. Interaction in the greater context of ship traffic (including both STM and non-STM ships). The evaluation was performed using qualitative methods in a process consisting of three main stages – A first analysis using heuristics from the domain of Human Reliability Analysis, an interview study with sea traffic system stakeholders, and a VTS simulator study. Results indicate that maritime administrations should employ a consistent design process that caters for local VTS Centre characteristics and the needs of their operators. As work with STM continues, technical development should be augmented with an iterative development of VTS system user experience and usability. Aspects of STM that are already known to require a human factors validation are, but not limited to: • That the new information provided to operators through the STM services is presented in a way that does not introduce confusion or obscure information (e.g. cluttering of routes, poor visibility of ships/routes/geographical features). • That alarms and/or alerts are relevant, useful and communicated effectively. Irrelevant alarms or alerts can disturb the work of the VTSO, and even if only relevant alerts are provided, the sum of all alerts can still produce a poor working environment (e.g. with regard to noise). • That STM services are coupled with sufficient support for notetaking and/or marking. With a larger bulk of information available to the operator (e.g. around possible future hazards) comes a larger need to support the operator attention and memory. • That the implementation of STM functions accounts for information management over several work shifts. • That predictive tools (e.g. prediction of future ship movements and associated conflicts) factor in prediction uncertainty, so that the operator is given a truthful representation of possible traffic development. • That there are means of communication suitable for use with the STM functions. Even though chat functionality was excluded from the STM BALT SAFE scope, some informants hold that other means of communication than VHF might be necessary if the ship is to send its route before reaching the VTS area. • That dynamics in VTS-ship interaction may be affected as new forms of communication develop. For example, even if the purpose of the VTS Centre is only to “inform” ships about traffic conditions, creating and sharing routes via STM services might be regarded as something more than a friendly suggestion. This invokes a discussion around VTS authority and responsibility in the event of an incident that needs to be continued. Evaluation data suggests that the use of STM functionality is not appropriate for all operative conditions, and that implementation must be calibrated against the practical needs of local VTS operators. Here, a balance must be struck between allowing for local adaption of STM services and offering a uniform STM interface towards vessels moving between different control areas. A final aspect of adaptation is the relation between VTS technical functionality and how these functionalities are put to practical use. Seeing that STM services could expand the operator time horizon and allow them to work more proactively, technical development should be combined with a review of local VTS procedures, making sure that the VTS operational approach (e.g. procedures for ship interaction or the functional level of VTS implementation) matches all the capabilities afforded by STM.